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Serial Collusion by Multi-Product Firms
August 13, 2018
William E. Kovacic *
Robert C. Marshall **
Michael J. Meurer ***
Abstract
We provide empirical evidence that many multi-product firms have each participated in
several cartels over the past 50 years. Standard analysis of cartel conduct, as well as
enforcement policy, is rooted in the presumption that each cartel in which a given firm
participates is a singular activity, independent of other cartel conduct by the firm. We
argue that this analysis is deficient in many respects in the face of serial collusion by
multi-product firms. We offer policy recommendations to reign in serial collusion,
including a mandatory coordinated effects review for any merger involving a serial
colluder, regardless of the apparent nature of the merger.

I.

Introduction
“Thus, every agreement both helps to shape, and itself fits into, a logical
pattern of cartel control. By defining for each company its area of
operation, its duties and its rights, an agreement makes it possible for all
companies to plan, individually and in concert, with some assurance of
how each will behave. By limiting and regulating the activities of chemical
companies, cartel agreements get rid of the uncertainties of a freely
competitive market. The cartels provide a relatively stable framework
within which conflicting interests may be reconciled by maneuver,
bargain, and compromise.” 1

A rapidly emerging view holds that American markets have grown steadily more
concentrated over the last twenty years. 2 The evidence shows that a small number of
Global Competition Professor of Law and Policy, George Washington University Law School.
Distinguished Professor of Economics, Penn State University.
*** Abraham and Lillian Benton Scholar and Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. We
are grateful to Ales Filipi, Erik Hovenkamp, and BU Law faculty workshop participants, and
participants at the Competition Law Conference at BU. We are grateful to Alexandra Kaminsky, Luc
Lallement , Arazi Lubis, , Margaret Sabelhaus, Jinzi Sheng, and especially Charles Horgan for skillful
research assistance. Of course, all errors are our own.
1 GEORGE W. STOCKING & MYRON W. WATKINS, CARTELS IN ACTION: CASE STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
DIPLOMAcy 516 (1946).
2 See e.g., David Autor et al., Concentrating on the Fall of the Labor Share, 107 AMER. ECON. REV. 180
(2017); Jay Shambaugh, et al, The State of Competition and Dynamism: Facts about Concentration, StartUps, and Related Policies, (June 2018) https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-state-of-competition-anddynamism-facts-about-concentration-start-ups-and-related-policies/
*
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firms dominate sales across most markets, not just high-tech markets. 3 This trend is also
evident globally, and in most other leading economies. 4 Growing concentration is
accompanied by growing mark-ups and profits. 5 There are many theories about why
competitiveness has declined, but no consensus. One theory holds that lax antitrust
enforcement over the past two decades is a significant factor. 6
Critics of antitrust enforcers focus on lax merger enforcement and tolerance of
alleged abuses of dominant positions by high-tech firms. Other economists theorize that
rising concentration is best explained by the growing importance of network effects, the
growing importance of investments in information technology, and various other factors. 7
We take no position in this Article on what has caused increased concentration,
nor do we take a position on the merits of antitrust enforcement against abuse of
dominance. Instead, we hope to shed some light on possible failings in a domain of
antitrust enforcement that most commentators believe has been quite successful over the
past two decades – anti-cartel enforcement. We analyze enforcement improvements that
could better deter cartel formation and ward off the associated suppression of
competition.
We applaud increased vigor in global anti-cartel enforcement, and we do not
dispute there have been remarkably successful prosecutions of global price-fixing in
recent years. But certain patterns revealed by these prosecutions make us worry about
what more might be out there. We wonder whether aggressive enforcement has deterred
most price fixing or if instead, sprawling price fixing agreements remain hidden to
enforcers who have become complacent.
The evidence of serial collusion by major multi-product firms is readily
observable from the public record. 8 In the chemical industry, focusing solely on
European Commission decisions, the following firms have been caught colluding in at
Id. at 182.
Id.
5 See Shambaugh et al., supra note 2, at 2; Jan de Loecker & Jan Eeckhout, The Rise of Market Power and
the Macroeconomic Implications, (2017); Calligaris, Criscuolo, and Marcolin Mark-ups in the Digital Era,
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/industry-and-services/mark-ups-in-the-digital-era_4efe2d25-en.
6 See generally Gustavo Grullon et al., Are US Industries Becoming More Concentrated? (2016)
https://finance.eller.arizona.edu/sites/finance/files/grullon_11.4.16.pdf
7 See Autor et al., supra note 2, at 185; James Bessen, Information Technology and Industry
Concentration (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3044730.
8 It is important to note that a large multi-product serial colluder often has co-conspirators that are
single product firms. When we use the terminology “serial multi-product cartels” we mean that there
is at least one firm in the cartel that is a large multi-product firm and that has been involved in cartels
in different product areas through time. Connor examined cartel convictions from 1990 to 2009 and
found that “52 firms were members of seven or more cartels; 26 were in ten or more cartels; and six
companies engaged in 20 or more cartels…. These top recidivists are primarily headquartered in the
EU.” JOHN M. CONNOR, RECIDIVISM REVEALED: PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL CARTELS 1990-2009 at 16. See
Section II for more detailed empirical evidence regarding “serial multi-product cartels”.
3
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least four products since 1955 – Akzo Nobel, BASF, Solvay, Bayer, Degussa, Hoechst,
Arkema/Atofina, Shell, Rhone Poulenc/Aventis, ICI, Elf Aquitaine, and Atochem. In the
electronics industry, focusing solely on European Commission decisions, the following
firms have been caught colluding in at least four products since 1980 – Hitachi, Samsung,
Mitsubishi, Toshiba, and Panasonic. In the auto parts industry, including European
Commission and Department of Justice cases, the following firms have been caught
colluding in at least three products since 2000 – Hitachi, DENSO, Autoliv, TRW, NGK
Spark Plug, Mitsubishi, Mitsuba, Robert Bosch, Toyoda, Panasonic, Valeo, and Yazaki.
In the financial industry, focusing solely on European Commission decisions, the
following firms have been caught colluding in at least three products since 2000– JP
Morgan, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), and Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS). In the
graphites industry, including European Commission and Department of Justice cases,
SGL has been caught colluding in three products since 2000. Disturbingly, many of these
firms have been caught colluding in substantially more than four products – for Hitachi
the number is sixteen, for Akzo Nobel the number is nine. 9
Note that these are the cartels that have been detected. Effective collusion is
clandestine; these firms could be participating in many other undetected cartels. Because
of this detection problem credible empirical work that estimates the magnitude of
unobserved cartels is difficult. 10 At any rate, the collusion in at least three of the
industries persists – new investigations have recently been opened regarding collusion in
the chemical, auto parts, and financial products markets. 11
Evidence that serial collusion predominates over one-shot cartels should help
change beliefs about why firms fix prices and violate antitrust law. Many commentators
believe that organizational failures within firms are the primary causes of collusion. They
argue that lax monitoring and inappropriate incentives allow and encourage rogue
More details will follow in Section II. In some cases we include cartel participation by predecessor
firms that were acquired by the named firm. Connor reports that Hitachi participated in 20
international cartels with 18 of those ending in the current millennium. Id. at 29.
10 A literature review by Connor indicates that “[c]artel studies generally conclude that only about 10
percent to 30 percent of all such conspiracies are discovered and punished.” Id. at 14, but we read
these studies with caution!
11 See Allissa Wickham, EU Fines Ball Bearing Makers $1.3B For Price-Fixing, LAW360, March 19, 2014,
https://www.law360.com/articles/519825/eu-fines-ball-bearing-makers-1-3b-for-price-fixing (“To
date, more than 100 products and 70 companies have been investigated in the commission’s car
parts probe, according to Almunia. He noted that the EC is still examining alleged cartels in seat belts,
air bags, steering wheels, air conditioning parts and lighting systems, among other car products.”);
Matt Bernardini, Bayer, Dow Hit with Polyurerthane Price-Fixing Suit, LAW360, August 2, 2018,
https://www.law360.com/articles/1068955 (class action price-fixing lawsuit against Bayer, Dow
and other alleging price fixing in two chemical markets); David Keohane & Jessica Dye, BNP Paribas’
US Unit Pleads Guilty to FX Price-fixing Conspiracy, FINANCIAL TIMES (January 26, 2018) (BNP is “the
sixth major bank to face criminal charges as a result of the DoJ’s investigation into antitrust and fraud
crimes” in the foreign exchange market) https://www.ft.com/content/76dda416-02af-11e8-96509c0ad2d7c5b5; Joe Rennison & Alexandra Scaggs, US Treasury Dealers Accused of Collusion by Big
Investors Paribas’ US Unit Pleads Guilty to FX Price-fixing Conspiracy, FINANCIAL TIMES (November 16,
2017) (ten banks including JP Morgan, Barclays, Goldman Sachs, UBS, and Morgan Stanley have been
accused of fixing prices for U.S. government securities) https://www.ft.com/content/45bc40dacab1-11e7-ab18-7a9fb7d6163e.
9
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division managers to fix prices. Yet, the typical responsible managers who are identified
in price fixing investigations do not seem to be rogues, and seem instead to be top
officers of the accused firms. 12 To be sure, the rogue manager scenario serves the
interests of both serial colluding firms and enforcement authorities. Serial colluding firms
can declare each episode of the conduct “rogue” and somehow avoid probing inquiries as
to whether they have a business model that embraces explicit collusion. Public
authorities, whose interests with antitrust enforcement should be at odds with serial
colluders, have almost never pointed to the multiple episodes of cartel conduct by these
major multi-product firms as a separate and distinct concern because it is in their interest
to tout their great success with cartel law enforcement, one case at a time.
The operation of serial collusion belies the rogue manager story and suggests
instead that collusion is simply a way of doing business for many firms. Consider for
example serial collusion in the chemical industry. Firms in this industry relied on the
consulting firm, Fides/AC Treuhand, to facilitate, implement, and run seven chemical
cartels. 13 Every chemical firm listed above was in a cartel that used the services of
Fides/AC Treuhand. How would rogue division managers, acting on their own and thus
without support from anyone inside their firm, gain access to the cartel consulting
services of Fides/AC Treuhand? Would they make an “out of the blue” phone call or
knock on the door of Fides/AC Treuhand, without introduction of any kind, and ask for
Fides/AC Treuhand to help them form and run a cartel? The regular use of Fides/AC
Treuhand by large multi-product chemical firms suggests, as a reasonable conjecture, that
(i) each firm has institutional knowledge of the value provided by Fides/AC Treuhand in
assisting with suppression of interfirm rivalry, (ii) new division managers are trained to
be aware of this value, and (iii) introductions to Fides/AC Treuhand are done by more
senior people at the firm who have previous experience with Fides/AC Treuhand.
Collusion across a broad range of products by large multi-product firms creates
many more degrees of freedom in addressing standard cartel problems than is available to
single product firms engaged in collusion. The central problem of a cartel is secret
deviations by members. All cartel members have an incentive to cheat on the collusive
agreement, to sell more at elevated prices than what the cartel agreement specifies for
them. To address this central problem, cartels implement structures, if they do not already
exist, for pricing, allocation of the collusive gain, and enforcement of the cartel
agreement. If two large multi-product firms are colluding across many product lines, they
may, for example, make side payments to one another across product lines, have one firm
exit one product and compensate that firm with the accommodation of entry by their coconspirator in another, and sacrifice the profits in one cartel to punish deviant behavior
by a single product co-conspirator as a warning signal to other single product firms with
whom they are colluding in other products. None of these kinds of conducts are available
or make sense for single product cartel members. Again, multi-product serial colluders
have a greatly expanded set of actions they can take to enhance cartel profits across their
See infra section III.D.
European Commission cartel decisions document Fides/AC Treuhand’s involvement in seven
chemical cartels (and another two in the wood products industry). We discuss this in detail infra in
sections II and IV.B.
12
13
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portfolio of cartels. It is important to recognize the possibility that large multi-product
serial colluders are managing a portfolio of cartels, not a single cartel.
The expanded set of opportunities available to firms that are managing a portfolio
of cartels makes such cartels, on average, more profitable, stable, and long lasting. Thus,
serial collusion likely causes more social harm and is harder to deter than one-shot
collusion. All else equal, socially optimal enforcement efforts should be more rigorous in
a world of serial collusion as compared to a world with equally frequent one-shot
collusion.
Simply asking enforcement agencies and courts to take off their blinders and pay
attention to serial collusion could help achieve greater rigor. Courts sometimes dismiss
evidence of a history of collusive conduct as irrelevant or as lacking sufficient relevance
to offset its potential for prejudice. They should not; this evidence is highly relevant. 14 A
history of serial collusion should also be used by enforcement agencies when deciding
whether to launch price fixing investigations and especially when reviewing mergers that
could facilitate future cartel activity.
We propose four reforms to improve anti-cartel enforcement. First, we spell out a
new cartel reconstruction program. Enforcers should work with colluding firms to learn
how each cartel worked, who was responsible, and what other markets might be affected.
Second, more extensive monitoring should be imposed on serial colluders in sentencing,
and settlement or plea agreements. A better understanding of the nature of serial collusion
is needed to guide enforcers to find the red flags that monitors should watch for.
Information from monitoring might trigger an investigation, and can also guide merger
review where it intersects with anti-cartel enforcement. Third, we discuss problems with
current leniency programs and explain why enforcers should complement leniency
programs with bounty programs aimed at peeling small firms away from cartels. A
successful bounty program would make small firms unappealing members for inclusion
in a cartel which could destabilize a cartel or at least limit its ability to raise prices.
Finally, we favor a mandated review of mergers from a coordinated effects
perspective whenever a serial colluder submits a merger for review. Cartelization might
be facilitated even when the merging parties do not compete directly. For example, if
firm A proposes a merger with firm B, and firm A makes products 1 to 50 while B makes
products 51 to 100 there may appear to be, on the surface, no coordinated effects issue.
However, if firm A is a serial colluder that has regularly colluded with firm C, and firm C
makes many of the products that firm B makes, then a very real concern arises about the
potential post-merger expansion of the portfolio of cartels involving A and C.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we provide more detail regarding
the empirical evidence of serial collusion. In Section III we review the economic and
legal analysis of single product collusion. In Section IV we extend the standard law and
economic analysis of collusion, which is predicated on all collusion being singletons, to

14

See Christopher R Leslie, Foreign Price-Fixing Conspiracies, 67 DUKE L. J. 557 (2017)
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multi-product firms engaged in collusion across a broad range of products. In Section V
we flesh out policy recommendations. In Section VI we offer concluding comments.

II.

Empirical Evidence of Serial Collusion

The label “serial collusion” requires further examination. Multiple cartel episodes
by a given firm occurring over the same time interval where this time interval is
relatively short would not constitute serial collusion. For example, suppose a firm was
found to have participated in six cartels that each lasted 18 months from January 2000
until June 2001. We display this possibility in the Hypothetical Duration Chart below.
Collusive behavior of this sort might be explained by a single top executive who
experimented briefly with explicit collusion, and the firm stopped the collusion when it
was uncovered by other officers or directors. This pattern does not suggest the firm has
adopted collusion as a way of doing business and the label serial collusion does not fit
this hypothetical.
Figures 1A, 1B, 2, 3 and 4 display cartel duration charts in the chemical,
electronics, auto parts, and financial products markets. The charts for the chemical,
electronics, and financial products markets do not look at all like the Hypothetical
Duration Chart. There is considerable variation in the start and end dates of the cartels
across different product lines. 15 The data in these charts is consistent with the view that
firms are serial colluders in the sense that they move into cartels when they have the
opportunity and move out of cartels when they collapse because of cheating or detection.
The auto parts cartels shows less heterogeneity with respect to duration though we
suspect serial collusion is also present in this industry, we will comment further on that
industry below. We present additional evidence later in this section that over the span of
decades certain serial colluders, especially in chemicals and electronics, have repeatedly
restarted cartels after earlier episodes of serial collusion have collapsed.
Besides examining cartel duration we believe it is also important to study the
pattern of cartel membership across the range of product markets present in an industry.
If collusion occurs exclusively between small subsets of the firms in an industry, and
these subsets stayed relatively isolated from one another, then this would be less
concerning than collusion across a broad range of firms through time. Collusion across a
broad range of firms would imply that all participating firms saw the value of collusion
across their many product lines and, additionally, cartel issues could be resolved across
products rather than solely within a given product.
The Hypothetical Cartel Involvement Table below displays a pattern in which the
colluding firms have formed collusive subsets that are isolated from each other. This
Jun Zhou, The Rise and Fall of Cartels with Multi-market Colluders, 48 REV. INDUSTRIAL ORG. 381
(2016). (2016) (“[C]artels with different markets but a common colluder usually start sequentially,
with, on average, approximately 3 years between each starting date. A similar pattern exists for
cartel dissolution where there is an overlap in membership between different cartels: there are, on
average, approximately two-and-a-half years between each dissolution date.”)

15
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pattern of behavior provides fewer benefits to cartel members in terms of stabilizing and
increasing the profitability of collusion, and thus it is less problematic. Figures 5-9 later
in this section display cartel involvement tables for the chemical, electronics, auto parts,
and financial products industries. The tables show a complex web of connections
between firms that substantially diverges from the Hypothetical Cartel Involvement
Table.
Now we will take a closer look at the duration charts in Figures 1A, 1B, 2, 3, and
4. Figures 1A and 1B are for the chemical firms listed in the introduction. Time in years
is plotted on the horizontal axis. A number identifying separate cartels is on the vertical
axis. The numbers correspond to the cartels identified in Appendix A. The cartels are
grouped by multi-product firms. For Akzo Nobel, the first firm in Figure 1A, we see a
horizontal bar for the first cartel, cartel 19, which is the Organic Peroxides cartel. The
solid line shows the duration of the cartel as reported in the EC decision. The Organic
Peroxides cartel lasted nearly 30 years, starting in the early 1970’s. It would be difficult
to credibly attribute a 30 year cartel to a single rogue division manager. Also, it seems
difficult to imagine that a cartel could function for 30 years without the knowledge of top
management at Akzo. It is clear that there are a range of start dates for the Akzo cartels,
from the early 1970’s to approximately 2005. The durations are 6 to 8 years for many
cartels. The range of start dates as well as the durations leads us to reject the notion that
there was a single top executive who tried collusion briefly across many product lines. As

8
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we look through the rest of the firms in Figure 1A and 1B we see a pattern of cartel
conduct similar to the conduct of Akzo. 16

Hypothetical Cartel Involvement Table

16 The European Commission recently carried out unannounced inspections of chemical firms that
purchase styrene monomers as part of an investigation of potential cartel conduct. The names of the
raided firms were not released by the European Commission. See European Commission Inspects
Styrene Monomer Purchasing Firms Suspected of Antitrust Breaches, ICIS NEWS June 8, 2018
breacheshttps://www.icis.com/resources/news/2018/06/08/10229758/european-commissioninspects-styrene-monomer-purchasing-firms-suspected-of-antitrust-breaches/.
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The first firm in Figure 1B is not a chemical firm. It is Fides/AC Treuhand.
According to its webpage, Fides/AC Treuhand is an association management company,
providing management services to trade associations, professional societies, and similar
organizations. For many of the European chemical cartels it managed and facilitated a
broad range of cartel activities such as coordination of price increases, cartel-related
communications, monitoring of compliance with the cartel agreement, and adjustment of
members’ share allocations. 17
It is evident from Figure 1B that Fides/AC Treuhand has played the role of cartel
facilitator for many years, for prolonged periods of time within each cartel, and across a
range of products. 18 It is interesting to note that only seven of the nine cartels listed for
Fides/AC Treuhand are in the chemical industry. The other two are in the wood products
industry. Apparently the value of Fides/AC Treuhand as a cartel facilitator is understood
in industries beyond chemicals.
Figure 2 provides the duration information for the electronics firms identified in
the introduction. Note that the time scale starts in 1980, not 1955. The cartels start at
different dates and they last for up to 15 years.

See, Eric Janssen, AC Treuhand and the Facilitating of Cartels, LEGAL KNOWLEDGE PORTAL, (Nov. 6,
2015), https://legalknowledgeportal.com/2015/11/06/ac-treuhand-and-the-facilitating-of-cartels/
(“AC Treuhand had detailed knowledge of the content of the cartel agreements and in fact had
formulated and distributed all the information regarding prices, quota and customers. It was allowed
to carry out audits in the offices of the cartel members. Only the data which had ultimately been
approved by AC Treuhand could serve as the basis for the negotiations and the agreements. AC
Treuhand had made its business premises available to keep the cartels hidden. According to the
European Commission, it was the task of AC Treuhand to prevent the discovery of the two cartel
infringements.”)
18 See, Rick Busscher, Martin Herz, & Hans Vedder, The Shortest Competition Judgment Ever; AC
Treuhand II, EUROPEAN LAW BLOG, (Nov. 9, 2015), http://europeanlawblog.eu/2015/11/09/theshortest-competition-judgment-ever-ac-treuhand-ii/ (“…as with any cartel, there needs to be
supervision and enforcement. This is tricky for cartelists themselves, as the supervisor is exposed to
the risk of being qualified as a ringleader, negating the possibility of immunity under the Leniency
Guidelines. Hence, the heat stabilisers cartel thought of a better way, namely hiring an independent
firm to ensure that parties stick to the cartel.”)
17
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Figure 3 presents the information for the auto parts cartels. The durations are
coincident for several of the cartels. For example, the first bar for Hitachi pertains to 7
cartels, all of which have the same duration. Note that the time range for the figure is
1995 to 2015. The auto parts cartels, viewed in isolation, leans away from an
interpretation of serial collusion since many of the cartels started at the same time.
However, the durations of many of the cartels is 10 years, which is difficult to explain as
being the action of a single rogue division manager.
Note that Hitachi appears in both the electronics and auto parts cartels.
Altogether, Hitachi participated in 16 cartels. Similarly, aggregating across electronics
and auto parts, Mitsubishi participated in 8 cartels and Panasonic in 8. Thus, it is
reasonable to conjecture that these three firms brought their prior experience with
collusion in electronics to auto parts.

14
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Finally, in the financial services industry, there have been fewer cartels detected
than in chemicals, electronics, or auto parts. Figure 4 presents information for the
financial services cartels. 19 Note that the time range in the figure is 2000 to 2015. JP
Morgan has participated in 5 cartels, 20 RBS in 4, and UBS in 3. 21 The start dates have
substantial variation and the durations are mostly on the order of 3 years.

Euro Interest Rate Derivatives Cartel involved seven banks: Barclays, Deutsche Bank, The Royal
Bank of Scotland, Societe Generale, Credit Agricole, HSBC, JPMorgan Chase. See Euro Interest Rate
Derivatives, 60 OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION17–20 (2017), https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52017XC0630(02)#document1. The first four
banks settled with the EC in December 2013 and paid over €820 million in total. The last three paid
€484 in total in December 2016 after refusing to settle. Swiss Franc Interest Rate Derivatives two
price fixing agreements were prosecuted. The Royal Bank of Scotland and JPMorgan Chase were
identified when RBS applied for immunity on August 9, 2011. Swiss Franc Interest Rate Derivatives,
CHF LIBOR, 58 OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION9–11 (2015), https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2015.072.01.0009.01.ENG RBS received full
immunity and JPMorgan Chase was fined over €61 million. Swiss Franc Interest Rate Derivatives, Bid
Ask Spread Infringement, 58 OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION14–16 (2015),
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2015.072.01.0014.01.ENG The
Yen Interest Rate Derivatives Cartel involved the United Bank of Switzerland, the Royal Bank of
Scotland, Deutsche Bank, Citigroup, JPMorgan, RP Martin, and ICAP. Yen Interest Rate Derivatives, 60
OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION10–14 (2015), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52017XC0915(02).
20 Evidence of collusion within municipal bonds from JP Morgan was obtained via DOJ cases against
two JP Morgan employees: James L. Hertz and Alexander Wright. See JPMorgan Chase Admits to
Anticompetitive Conduct by Former Employees in the Municipal Bond Investments Market and Agrees to
Pay $228 Million to Federal and State Agencies https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/jpmorgan-chaseadmits-anticompetitive-conduct-former-employees-municipal-bond-investments ; In the Matter of
Alexander W. Wright, https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2014/34-73074.pdf.
21 See Three Former UBS Executives Convicted for Frauds Involving Contracts Related to the Investment
of Municipal Bond Proceeds Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs (August 31, 2012),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-former-ubs-executives-convicted-frauds-involvingcontracts-related-investment-municipal ; See Former Employee of Financial Services Company Pleads
Guilty for Role in Bid-rigging and Fraud Conspiracies Involving Proceeds of Municipal Bonds,
Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs (May 19, 2010),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-employee-financial-services-company-pleads-guilty-rolebid-rigging-and-fraud
19
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We now return to the chemical industry and examine the pattern of firm
involvement with other firms across these cartels. Figure 5 presents that information with
firm names on the rows and cartel names in the columns. It is clear that the cartel
participation is not concentrated within specific pairs of firms but extends broadly across
many firms. It is important to note that every chemical firm in Figure 5 has been involved
in at least one cartel where Fides/AC Treuhand was a cartel facilitator.
Figure 6 presents the pattern of cartel involvement for the firms in the electronics
industry. Again, there is broad participation across the firms. In fact, Hitachi has
conspired with each of the other four firms in at least one cartel as has Samsung and
Toshiba.
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Figure 5: Cartel Involvement for Chemical Firms

Figure 6: Cartel Involvement for Electronics Firms
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Figure 7: Cartel Involvement for Auto Part Firms

Figure 8: Cartel Involvement for Financial Firms
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Figure 7 and 8 present the structure of involvement of relevant firms in the auto
parts and financial services cartels. There is an important caveat regarding these figures.
Unlike chemicals and electronics, the auto parts and financial services cartel cases are
sometimes drawn from the DOJ pleadings and admissions. The EC prohibition decisions
will enumerate all firms participating in a cartel but the DOJ will typically only identify
the firm that is pleading or admitting culpability. Thus the involvement matrices for auto
parts and financial services are truncated in contrast to the matrices for chemicals and
electronics. Of course, this is true for the duration figures as well. Namely, the firms not
identified by the DOJ in the auto parts and financial services cases are not in the duration
plots.
Overall, the frequency of collusion by this collection of firms across chemical,
electronics, auto parts, and financial product markets is striking. Despite additional
penalties imposed by some competition law systems for recidivism, many of these firms
chose to engage in a series of collusive schemes over a significant period of time. 22 The
firms active in each cartel change from cartel to cartel because these firms manufactured
different portfolios of products. Many firms encountered one another in two or more
cartels. Furthermore, for the chemical cartels there is the ongoing use of a cartel
facilitator.
Other researchers have documented repeat cartel offenses by many firms. Zhou observes: “Cartels
often involve firms that collude in more than one market…European Commission … cartel decisions
for 1985-2014 shows that 112 (71%) of the prosecuted cartels involved multi-market colluders.”
Zhou, supra note 15, at 381. Connor notes that “[d]uring 1990-2009 the French petrochemical
company Total SA participated in 27 cartels with 24 of those ending in the current millennium. The
French pharmaceutical firm Sanofi-Aventis participated in 22 with 8 of those ending in the current
millennium. The German chemical company BASF participated in 21 with 17 of those ending in the
current millennium. The French cement company Lafarge SA participated in 21 with 16 of those
ending in the current millennium. The German pharmaceutical company Bayer AG participated in 20
with 5 of those ending in the current millennium. The Japanese conglomerate Hitachi Ltd.
participated in 20 with 18 of those ending in the current millennium.” Connor, supra note 8, at 29.
“In the set of 510 cartel members fined by the EC in 1998-2014,” Marvão identifies 89
“multiple offenders” (firms fined for collusion more than once), 10 “repeat offenders” (firms which
initiate a cartel after being investigated for another cartel), and 5 recidivists. Marvão, The Issue of
Repeat Cartel Offences, Stockholm School of Economics: http://fpb.dev.kebbeit.lv/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/freepolicybriefs_feb1.pdf (2015). Marvão’s definition of recidivist
follows that used by Gregory J. Werden, Scott D. Hammond & Belinda A. Barnett, Recidivism
Eliminated: Cartel Enforcement in the United States Since 1999, SSRN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL(2011): firms
which initiate a cartel after being fined for another cartel.
Marvao describes her work with Levenstein and Suslow and concludes: “The authors show
that there is a large share of repeat and multiple offenders in chemicals and a surprisingly high
proportion of repeat offenders in the manufacture of transport and electrical equipment. The highest
proportion of multiple offenders is found in pharmaceuticals and refined petroleum products. The
transportation and storage market is a sector with a high incidence of collusion (83 convicted cartel
members), but no repeat offenders.” Id. discussing Margaret C. Levenstein, et al., Serial Collusion in
Context: Repeat Offenses by Firm or by Industry? OECD GLOBAL FORUM ON COMPETITION. DAF/COMP/GF
(2015).
Finally Levenstein et al review cartel convictions from 1990 to 2009 and note that “52 firms
were members of seven or more cartels; 26 were in ten or more cartels; and six companies engaged
in 20 or more cartels… .” Margaret C. Levenstein, et al. The effect of competition on trade: Evidence
from the collapse of international cartels, 39 INT’L J. INDUSTRIAL ORG. 56 (2015).
22
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Thus far our discussion has concentrated on recent cartel activity in four
industries for which we have the best data on participation and duration. We conclude
this section by highlighting other instances of serial collusion. Our discussion suggests
that serial collusion has been a global problem almost since the chemical industry was
established in Germany before 1900. Episodes of serial collusion centered in the United
States are also well represented in the history of price fixing.

Figure 9: Cartel Involvement for 1950s Electrical Firms

We begin by returning to collusion in the electronics industry. In Figures 2 and 6
we presented information about electronics cartels spanning twenty-five years starting in
the late 1980s. Figure 9 presents the pattern of cartel involvement in the electrical
industry that was uncovered in the U.S. in the late 1950s. The products in those earlier
cartels tended to relate more to electricity generation rather than components in consumer
electronics products featured in the more recent cartels.
The duration of these cartels is not clear, but two of the leading cartel members,
General Electric and Westinghouse were frequently investigated and prosecuted for
antitrust violations, including price fixing, in the decades leading up to and following the
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1950s electrical equipment conspiracy. 23 Twice before the electrical equipment
conspiracy General Electric and Westinghouse were sued for using patent licenses to
facilitate price fixing in electrical products. In a close and controversial case the
companies were acquitted in the first suit, U.S. v. General Electric (1924), but they were
found liable for price fixing in 1948 in U.S. v. Line Material. Southern States Equipment
Co., another one of the colluding firms listed in Figure 9, was also found liable in 1948.
Finally, in 1976 the DOJ reached a settlement agreement with GE and Westinghouse that
modified the 1962 consent decree. 24 The settlement was reached in response to
complaints by the electric utility industry that the companies continued to fix prices. 25
Steel is another industry that seems to have been plagued by serial collusion. 26 A
steel cartel was established in Western Europe during the late 1920s to cover exports of
various steel products. 27 American companies joined European companies to reestablish
a steel cartel from 1933 – 1938. It covered the same products as the 1920s cartel and
several additional products. 28 “[I]n 1938, almost ninety-eight percent of world steel
exports were regulated by restrictive production and marketing arrangements.” 29 After
World War II, U.S. Steel and Bethlehem Steel lead six different multi-market price-fixing
schemes. 30 “VSL construction was similarly involved (including as a leader) in multiple
US cartels across several decades with distinct, but overlapping partners.” 31 In the postwar U.S., Hay and Kelley uncovered ten distinct price fixing agreements related to steel
products, two were regional in scope and the other eight had a national scope, the
Westinghouse had twenty and General Electric had nineteen antitrust convictions from 1955-1980.
JAMES M. CLABAULT & MICHAEL K. BLOCK, SHERMAN ACT INDICTMENTS: 1955-1980, 905-11 (1981). Cited in
Connor, supra note 8, at 29.
24 The 1962 consent decree resolved the federal case against GE and Westinghouse related to the
price fixing activities covered in Figure 9. See Luis Cabral, GE and Westinghouse, NYU Stern (2010).
http://luiscabral.net/economics/teaching/gewestinghouse.pdf
25 Id.
26 U.S. Steel had eleven and Bethlehem Steel had seven antitrust convictions from 1955-1980. JAMES
M. CLABAULT & MICHAEL K. BLOCK, SHERMAN ACT INDICTMENTS: 1955-1980, at 905-11 (1981).
Cited in supra note 8, at 29.
27 Stocking & Watkins supra note 1, at 186 “Syndicates were set up to sell semifinished steel,
structural steel, merchant bars, hoops and strips, and plates in export markets for all cartel members
at uniform prices.”
28 Id. at 187-189 Second international steel cartel included American and European companies from
1933 through 1938. It controlled semifinished steel, structural steel, merchant bars, cold rolled
bands and strips, hot rolled bands and strips, and medium plates, thick plates, galvanized plates, tin
plates, wired rods, tubes and other products. Id.
29 See Martin J. Rosent, The Brussels Entente: Export Combination in the World Steel Market, 106 U.
PENN. L. REV. 1079 (1958).
30 See Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Price-Fixing Hits Home: An Empirical Study of U.S.
Price Fixing Conspiracies, (Ross School of Business Paper No. 1290) 7 (2015)
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2691579 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2691579) (“the firm U.S.
Steel was involved in six different conspiracies between 1948 and 1969, some of which involved
traditional steel products and producers, as in a 1963 case in which U.S. Steel, Bethlehem Steel and
others were convicted of conspiring to eliminate competition in the production of wheels, others
were less finished steel products, and yet others were in plastics. Some involved the same coconspirators, but others were an entirely new set of firms.”)
31 See Catarina Marvão, The Issue of Repeat Cartel Offences, Free Policy Network, Feb. 1, 2016,
http://freepolicybriefs.org/2016/02/01/the-issue-of-repeat-cartel-offences/
23
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products were: wrought steel wheels, rolled steel pipe flanges and rings, bed springs,
metal library shelving, fabricated structural steel, carbon steel sheets, stainless steel
welding electrodes, and wholesale distribution of steel products. 32 In the new century,
suits have been brought against steel product price fixers in both the Europe and the U.S.
“The European Commission has fined 17 producers of prestressing steel a total of
€458,410,750 for operating a cartel that lasted 18 years until 2002 and covered all but
three of the then European Union Member States..” 33 “Eight steel producers were
accused of price fixing in a private suit filed by U.S. steel purchasers in 2008. Five of the
defendants settled for a total of $103.7 million.” 34 Finally, “German authorities
announced an investigation of seven makers of flat steel for price fixing in the fall of
2017.” 35
Multi-product collusion has a long history in the chemical industry going back to
the 1880s and appearing in most decades since then. A central player is the German
chemical company I.G. Farben, its predecessors and its offspring. 36Three of the chemical
companies listed in Figure 5 were at the core of I.G. Farben. Bayer, Hoechst, and BASF
merged (along with three other firms) to form it in 1925. And those three firms
reemerged during the liquidation of I.G. Farben at the end of World War II. Stocking and
Watkins observed that: “The breadth of its chemical interests has led IG [Farben] into
agreements with every major world chemical producer, covering together virtually every
branch of chemical manufacturing.” 37 Although the system of cartels was based in
Europe, it included American firms in global export cartels and reached directly into the
domestic American markets. A German-American cartel was formed in magnesium
powder and fabricated magnesium that included I.G. Farben, Dow, and Alcoa. 38 DuPont
found English and Swedish partners to implement global cartels in other markets. In the
interwar period duPont and Nobel extended their global cartel from explosives to
“dyestuffs, artificial leather, celluloid” and it eventually “embraced all products in the
sale of which the two companies, save for the agreement, would have been
competitors.” 39 In the late 1930s du Pont and ICI updated their chemical cartel agreement
with “the inclusion of new products, many of which were already being treated as though
they were included – notably certain chlorine products, antiknock compounds, synthetic
resins and plastics, pharmaceuticals, Neoprene (du Pont's synthetic rubber), and nylon.” 40
See George A. Hay & Daniel Kelley, An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies, 17 J. L. & ECON.
13 (1974).
33 Antitrust: Commission fines prestressing steel producers € 458 million for two decades long pricefixing and market-sharing cartel, European Commission, 06 October 2010, europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_IP-10-1297_en.pdf
34 See Nick St. Denis, Three Steel Companies Hold their Ground in Price-Fixing Lawsuit, November 30,
2015 https://www.usglassmag.com/2015/11/three-steel-companies-hold-their-ground-in-pricefixing-lawsuit/
35 See Reuters, German Cartel Office Deepens Steel Investigation, Searches Firms, Sept. 4, 2017
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-steel-antitrust/german-cartel-office-deepens-steelinvestigation-searches-firms-idUSKCN1BF1E1
36 See Stocking & Watkins, supra note 1, at x.
37 Id. at 466.
38 Id. at 274-303.
39 Id. at 448.
40 Id. at 454
32
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III.

A Framework for Analyzing Single Product Explicit Collusion

Global acceptance of an anti-cartel norm is perhaps the most important
development in competition law and policy in the past 20 years. 41 For most of the 20th
century, the prosecution of cartels was largely the preoccupation of U.S. enforcement
agencies. Most jurisdictions regarded supplier collusion as a secondary priority. Some
actively resisted U.S. efforts to chase cartels outside its own borders.
In the late 1990s, the lysine and vitamins cartel prosecutions changed all of that.
The Department of Justice (DOJ) recovered massive, unprecedented fines against the
participants in both collusive schemes, whose audacity, complexity, and effectiveness
startled the antitrust world. 42 Shamed by their earlier complacency and lured by the
prospect of immense financial recoveries, many competition agencies boarded the anticartel bandwagon. Today agency leaders regularly call cartels the worst competitive
scourge of the market place. 43
In the past twenty years anti-cartel enforcement has been modernized in important
ways, especially through diffusion of vigorous enforcement policies in many other
countries, and in the widespread adoption of leniency programs. 44 By some measures,
the resulting international campaign against cartels seems to be working. Enforcement
agency bar charts tracing total cases, civil fines, criminal fines, and prison sentences
climb impressively upward. 45 Enforcement officials in the European Union and the
United States point with evident pride to the greater severity of sanctions imposed on
cartel offenders. 46 Agency press releases speak in the language of sports: new heights in
recoveries are “records” akin to achieving the largest number of goals scored in a season
41 This trend is reflected in the proceedings, recommendations, and reports of international
organizations that seek to promote the development of global competition policy norms. See
International Competition Network, Cartel Working Group, Setting of Fines for Cartels in ICN
Jurisdictions (2017); International Competition Network, Cartel Working Group, Compilation of Good
Practices from the Anti-Cartel Enforcement Manual (Nov. 25, 2016); Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, Fighting bid rigging in public procurement: report on implementing
the OECD recommendation (2016); Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Hard
Core Cartels: third report on the implementation of the 1998 OECD recommendation (2005); United
Nations Conference on Trade & Development, Model Law on Competition (2010).
42 Andrew I. Gavil et al., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN
COMPETITION POLICY 6-17 (West Publishing, 3d Ed., 2017).
43 William E. Kovacic, Chairman, U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Competition Policy in the European
Union and in the United States: Convergence or Divergence? (June 2, 2008) (Bates White 5th Annual
Antitrust Conference, Washington, D.C.)
44 ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT IN A CONTEMPORARY AGE: LENIENCY RELIGION (Caron BeatonWells & Christopher Tran, eds. Hart Publishing, 2015) .
45 Scott Hammond & Ann O’Brien, The Evolution of Cartel Enforcement over the Last Two Decades:
The U.S. Perspective, in POLISH OFFICE OF COMPETITION & CONSUMER PROTECTION, CHANGES IN
COMPETITION POLICY OVER THE LAST TWO DECADES 11 (Malgorzada Krasnodebska-Tomkiel ed.,
2010).
46 See, e.g., European Commission, Press Release, Statement by Commissioner Vestager on
Commission decision to fine seven companies for participation in four cartels (Feb. 21, 2018),
available at europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-18-1022_en.htm.

25

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3235398

or a career. 47 Newer authorities underscore their own progress by pointing to a higher
tempo of prosecutions, increased recoveries, and enhanced enforcement tools. The drive
to achieve higher recoveries and more convictions derives encouragement from
commentators, journalists, and political leaders who regard higher activity levels as good
measures of agency performance. 48 In addition, huge damage awards in private cases,
and the gradual global adoption of private rights of action, reinforce the impression of
increasing enforcement effectiveness.
The traditional activity-based measures of enforcement performance accurately
suggest that the hazards for cartel participants are greater today than they were a few
decades ago. The expansion of anti-cartel enforcement is an impressive public policy
accomplishment, and the enhancement of modern enforcement tools – notably, the
development of more powerful leniency mechanisms 49 – present admirable progress in
policymaking.
Despite these accomplishments, reasons for discomfort about the effectiveness of
anti-cartel programs remain. 50 The volume of fines and prison sentences are badly
imperfect proxies for gains in social welfare. They do not indicate whether antitrust
enforcement is achieving one of its central aims: to deter firms from engaging in illegal
collusion in the first place. Indeed, climbing levels of prosecutions and punishments are
ambiguous evidence of effectiveness; they could be taken to suggest that a significant
number of firms regard the possibility of detection and prosecution to be acceptable
business risks. 51
See European Commission, Statement by Commissioner Vestager on fining Scania for participating
in trucks cartel (Sept. 27, 2017), available at europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-173509_en.htm. In describing developments in the prosecution of a European truck manufacturers
cartel, Margrethe Vestager, the Commissioner for Competition, said “We have fined the six companies
of Euros 3.8 billion – a record fine for a cartel in the EU’s 60 year history.”
48 On the popularity of these measures of effectiveness, see William E. Kovacic, Rating the Competition
Agencies: What Constitutes Good Performance?, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 903 (2009).
49 The establishment of the modern leniency mechanism by the U.S. Department of Justice in 1993 is
an impressive example of what Philip Weiser has called “entrepreneurial administration.” Philip J.
Weiser, Entrepreneurial Administration, 97 B.U. L. REV. 2011 (2017).
50 We share the concern of other commentators who have questioned how successful enforcement
has been and whether deterrence is currently adequate. See e.g., Louis Kaplow, An Economic
Approach to Price Fixing, 77 ANTITRUST L. J. 343, 424-425 (2011) (“Although subject to reservations
and some ambiguity, it appears that both law and practice base the fine on something closer to a
fixed fraction of firms’ revenues in the affected markets, with little or no adjustment to reflect the
actual price elevation. … Accordingly, setting to the side other penalties (which may be substantial in
the United States because of private suits, but less so elsewhere), deterrence is likely to be highly
inadequate when large overcharges occur since fines will be less than firms’ profits, even ignoring
any probability discount.”)
51 In this respect, we are intrigued by the European Commission’s recent prosecutions of
manufacturers of heavy trucks for colluding to coordinate pricing and to time the introduction of
emissions abatement technology. European Commission, Press Release, Antitrust: Commission fines
Scania for participating in trucks cartel (Sept. 27, 2017), available at Europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_IP-17-3502_en.htm. Through September 2017, the Commission had reached settlements
totaling nearly 3 billion euros with MAN, DAF, Daimler, Ivaco, and Volvo/Renault and had imposed a
fine of 880 million euros on Scania. The alleged cartel participants are substantial enterprises. By
any measure, the firms involved are well versed in the rules of competition law by reason of having
47
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In this section, we sketch the design and enforcement of the legal framework that
applies to collusive agreements. Here we also describe the economics regarding the
formation and operation of cartels. Our focus in this section is one in which rival firms
engage in explicit collusion (i.e., they resort to an express exchange of assurances) with
regard to a single product. This provides valuable background for our consideration of
multi-product collusive arrangements in Section IV below.
Five major themes emerge from our review of the economics and law related to
single product collusion. First, we wish to underscore the difficulties associated with
forming and implementing a successful cartel. These include the three tasks made famous
by George Stigler (forming a consensus, detecting cheating on the consensus, and
punishing deviations) 52 and the likewise important suppression of external threats (most
importantly, buyer resistance, new entry, and the incursion of substitute products)
illuminated in Michael Porter’s “five forces” model of business strategy. 53 As we have
said in previous work, nothing about this is easy. 54 Rivals who gather furtively in a hotel
conference room or a restaurant to declare their commitment to raise prices, yet do not
devise plans over the course of the operation of the cartel to surmount all of these

substantial in-house legal departments and access to law firms with the best competition law
practices. The cartel is alleged to have begun in 1997 and run through at least early January 2011, a
period in which the European Commission’s Directorate for Competition was visibly ramping up its
cartel enforcement program and bringing high profile cases. In the trucks matter the Commission
carried out a dawn raid in January 2011 after receiving a leniency application from MAN. Why did
these large companies execute an illicit scheme in the face of easily recognized and progressively
more aggressive efforts by the European Commission to prosecute cartels? Two explanations come
to mind. First, the theory of the case may have involved a Commission effort to expand the zone of
behavior deemed to be improper collusion – perhaps, a bolder effort to treat information exchanges
as proof of improper coordination. If the prosecution indeed represented an outward extension of
the existing law enforcement perimeter, one can understand that the firms may have thought that
their behavior, though risky from an antitrust point of view, would not be treated as a hard core
infringement. If the Commission was using a novel theory of illegality, why wouldn’t all six firms
resist instead of settling? Five firms may have thought the settlement amount was better than the
risk of a still higher fine (the EU maximum is ten percent of global turnover). Scania alone is
contesting the charges. A second explanation is that the firms are accused of forms of conduct that
the Commission previously and clearly had treated as illegal collusion. If this is the case, one should
ask again why the companies would persist in the behavior through the 2000s in the face of
increasingly stringent EC anti-cartel enforcement? In this scenario, there is the sobering possibility
that the massive settlement amounts are not a sign of policy success but instead suggest a
fundamental failure of deterrence.
52 George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964). For a vivid illustration of the
difficulties that a cartel can face in setting output limits and allocating market shares among the
participants, see United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d. 645 (7th Cir. 2000).
53 See MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING INDUSTRIES AND COMPETITORS
4 (1980)
54 See ROBERT C. MARSHALL & LESLIE MARX, THE ECONOMICS OF COLLUSION: CARTELS AND BIDDING RINGS
(2012); William E. Kovacic et al., Bidding Rings and the design of anti-collusion measures for auctions
and procurements, in HANDBOOK OF PROCUREMENBT 149 (Nicolas Dimitri et al. eds., Cambridge
University Press, 2006); Randal Heeb et al., Cartels as Two-Stage Mechanisms: Implications for the
Analysis of Dominant-Firm Conduct, 10 CHICAGO J. INT’L L. 213 (2009).
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obstacles, either by themselves or with the assistance of expert advisors, have taken grave
risks with little prospect of success.
Our second observation is that the difficulty and complexity of cartel formation
and management tasks require considerable technical and managerial skill – for example,
in devising and adjusting the assignment of market shares, in tracking sales volumes by
individual cartel members, or in constructing methods for executing the side payments
that ensure fidelity to the common scheme. As with any other dimension of organization
and management, there are benefits from the learning – the repeated performance of the
same tasks over time. Cartel members could realize these benefits either by repeated
participation in collusive schemes (among themselves or with other firms) or by engaging
third parties (e.g., an accounting firm such as Fides/ AC Treuhand) which have broad
experience in assisting cartels.
The third major point from our research, explored more fully below in Section IV,
is that the involvement of senior company officials is typically important for effective
cartel coordination. The complexity, durability, and scope of many cartels likely requires
commitment at the highest level of the company and the participation of key senior
officials, as well as middle managers. We can imagine that low level subordinates in
some instances devise and execute collusion schemes without the knowledge or
acquiescence of top management. This is unlikely to be the main case, especially for the
massive, intricate, long-lived arrangements that figure so often in modern cartel
prosecutions. Without high level involvement, such schemes would likely not be
possible.
Our fourth observation is that cartel members, in many cases, cannot perform the
collection of complex, difficult cartelization tasks without continuing engagement. The
“contract” that represents the shared commitment to raise prices is by necessity highly
relational. It should be flexible to adapt to changed circumstances (e.g., an increase in
demand that was not anticipated when the colluding firms first allocated market shares
among themselves) and to respond to external threats to the operation of the collusive
scheme (e.g., a move by a major purchaser to vertically integrate into the production of
the input currently controlled by the cartel). Adaptation and adjustment require
consultations for the group to determine how to proceed. Moreover, there is an inherent
degree of incompleteness in all contracts, owing to compromises that inject ambiguity
into certain terms or to the inability of the parties to anticipate and address all
contingencies. Like legitimate contracts, cartel agreements are incomplete for the same
reasons. To address the consequences of incompleteness as performance of the
agreement takes place, cartel participants often communicate with each other – to devise
solutions to unexpected contingencies or to confront ambiguities or disagreements that
the parties sidestepped when they entered the scheme.
The importance of continued engagement and communications among
participants suggests a fifth theme, developed more extensively in Section IV.
Communications can be improved, and the performance of the cartel’s key operational
tasks can be enhanced, as the range of the firms’ interaction expands in time and scope.
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The performance of a single cartel generates considerable knowledge, trust, and
understanding that can be applied usefully in additional cartels. Repeated interaction
over time in new collusive episodes helps the cartel refine its operational techniques,
improve means of communication, increase understanding of each firm’s culture,
conduct, and intentions (to improve the ability of each firm to anticipate and interpret the
moves of its counterparts), and, where suspicion and doubt always lurk in the
background, to strengthen trust. Engagement across a broader scope of products provides
additional contact points that can enhance coordination – for example, by providing more
avenues to make side payments, more possibilities for punishing deviations, and more
means to use leniency strategically to channel the attention of enforcement agencies
toward a decaying or dead cartel and away from a vibrant or promising collusive
arrangement.
The phenomena described above place a premium on establishing a framework of
legal rules and enforcement mechanisms that accounts for the dynamism of cartel
behavior and makes the fullest possible use of knowledge gained about how cartels
operate and how they respond to new advances in enforcement methods. We emphasize
that, although the formation and execution of a cartel is no easy task, the rewards for
successful cartelization are substantial. The history of antitrust policy since the late 19th
century demonstrates that firms have responded to enhancements in the law enforcement
regime – the bolstering of substantive legal commands, sanctions, and methods of
detection – with a host of countermeasures to avoid detection or blunt the impact of more
severe punishments. This history suggests that the arms race between law enforcement
and cartelists has not subsided. Competition agencies should be no less adaptive or
ingenious than the cartelists they are seeking to apprehend and, better, deter.

A. Antitrust Law and the Treatment of Collusive Horizontal Agreements
As suggested above, the prohibition of cartelization is at the heart of antitrust
law. 55 By statute, by jurisprudence, or by both, the definition of the offense has evolved
in stages. In the United States, early cases confronted and condemned the setting of the
complete price of the product or service. 56 In fits and starts, the U.S. jurisprudence
gravitated, by the late 1930s and early 1940s, toward the establishment of a categorical
prohibition (a “per se” rule) against horizontal price fixing. 57 The principle of strict
prohibition was extended to encompass restrictions that affect the final price and quality
of the product or service; these include customer and territorial allocations, 58 agreements
to restrict the use of certain product inputs, 59 the fixing of one element of the total price

55 The developments covered here are examined in more detail in Alison Jones & William E. Kovacic,
Identifying Anticompetitive Agreements in the United States and the European Union: Developing a
Coherent Analytical Framework, 62 ANTITRUST BULL. 254 (2017); Alison Jones, Analysis of Agreements
under U.S. and E.U. antitrust law – Convergence or divergence?, 57 ANTIRUST BULL. 691 (2006).
56 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
57 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940)
58 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
59 National Macaroni Manufacturers Ass’n v. Federal Trade Commission, 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965).
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(e.g., financing terms). 60 Most recently, the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission have announced that both agencies will prosecute, as per se offenses,
“no-poaching” agreements by which firms agree not to make unsolicited calls to recruit
employees of their rivals. 61 The delineation of agreements subject to summary
condemnation has been accompanied by, and sometimes has followed, developments in
academic literature and professional commentary about the economic impact of the
challenged practices.
As a consensus has developed about the economic and social harm associated
with cartels, there has been a progressive increase in sanctions and methods of detection,
with the most extraordinary enhancements taking place in the past half-century. In the
United States, criminal prosecution of cartel agreements is routine practice. Individual
defendants face maximum prison terms of ten years, and those convicted of cartel
offenses, or who plead guilty, are likely to spend at least two years in prison. Monetary
fines now can run into the hundreds of millions – indeed, billions – of dollars as a result
of fining mechanisms that allow the Justice Department to collect double the gain to
violators or double the loss to victims.
Detection techniques have been enhanced hand in hand with the increase in
sanctions. DOJ introduced its modern leniency program in 1993 and since has introduced
a series of enhancements. DOJ and the FBI use the full range of electronic surveillance
and related information gathering methods available for the investigation of organized
crime. Over 60 jurisdictions worldwide have adopted leniency programs, and the use of
search warrants to gather information from business premises is a common element of
global antitrust law enforcement.
Two major issues have accompanied the elaboration of the substantive principles
and enforcement methods described above. The first is the definition of what constitutes a
collusive scheme worthy of summary condemnation. Courts have recognized that
agreements to set prices or other terms of trade are worthy of fuller analysis, and
sometimes deserve approval, when they facilitate the development of a new product or
service or enable firms to generate efficiencies for consumers that otherwise would not be
available in the absence of the restrictions. 62 Modern U.S. jurisprudence makes clear that
firms always have the opportunity to introduce cognizable, plausible efficiency rationales
for challenged restrictions, and that the presence of such rationales precludes per se
condemnation.
The second pivotal issue is the definition of what constitutes concerted action. If
no efficiency rationales are present, the key issue in the case will be whether the firms

Catalano , Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980).
United States Department of Justice, Press Release, Justice Department and Federal Trade
Commission Release Guidance for Human Resource Professionals on How Antitrust Law Applies to
Employee Hiring and Compensation (Oct. 20, 2016). In the announcement, the Justice Department
stated its intention to prosecute infringements of this policy as crimes.
62 See Jones & Kovacic, supra note 55.
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acted alone or in concert. 63 The enhancement of sanctions and means of detection has led
firms to take various steps to mask their coordination. Many of the government’s cartel
prosecutions and private antitrust cases hinge on decisions about what types of evidence
(known as “plus factors”), when added to the fact of parallel conduct, permit a judge or a
jury to infer agreement. As set out below in Section IV and in our earlier work, we argue
that careful examination of past cases and investigations yields valuable insights about
which types of behavior deserve emphasis as plus factors.
In the discussion of policy recommendations that concludes this paper, we
propose that government agencies and researchers undertake larger efforts to collect data
on the origins and operations of specific cartels for three purposes: (1) to identify
promising focal points for investigations; (2) to increase our understanding of which
types of observed conduct should be treated as plus factors to sustain an inference of
agreement; and (3) to improve the operation of compliance programs through which
government agencies and firms monitor adherence to the law against collusion.

B. The Effects of Collusion
Competition among vendors has two main advantages. First, it reveals
information to a buyer that it might not be able to discover on its own. Second, it helps a
buyer get greater quantity or better quality than it could in the absence of competition. To
illustrate these advantages, and thus the justification for the prohibition against price
fixing, consider an example in which a medical supply firm buys chairs for its new
offices.
Suppose a firm wants to acquire one wooden office side chair of a given prespecified size and quality. Suppose the firm can purchase the chair from a local office
furniture supplier for $250. In contrast, suppose the firm wants to buy at least 2,000 such
chairs. If the purchase of a single chair of a given quality costs $250 what should the
firm expect to pay for 2,000 such chairs? Should the firm expect to pay, per chair, $250
or something less than that, perhaps even quite a bit less than that? A medical supply firm
has no expertise to assess what 2,000 office chairs should cost. So, the firm uses
competition to learn about the market price for such chairs, inviting all qualified vendors
of such chairs to submit bids for the provision of at least 2,000 chairs. Each invited
supplier will know that they are competing with others in their industry for the contract.
The competition between the vendors is such that, although winning with a high bid
would be quite profitable, each vendor realizes that a high bid has a low probability of
winning. To enhance the probability of winning each vendor will consider submitting low
bids. The bids of each bidder will be bounded – no bidder will want to earn negative
profits by winning. Also, the greater the number of bidders the more aggressive each
bidder will need to be to enhance their chance of winning. Suppose there are five vendors
invited to bid and the low bid turns out to be $125 per chair. Competition among the
vendors has revealed to the purchasing firm information that they would not have been
See, William E. Kovacic, et al., Plus Factors and Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 393
(2011).
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able to acquire on their own – namely, that 2,000 chairs can be acquired at half the per
chair cost of buying a single chair.
But there is an additional benefit of the competition. The bid solicitation had
specified the purchase of at least 2,000 chairs. With a winning bid of $125 per chair,
which may be quite a bit lower than the prior belief that the firm had about what they
would pay for the chairs, the firm may decide to purchase an additional 200 chairs.
The winning bid of $125 may not leave much of a profit margin for the winning
vendor. The five invited bidders each realize that the competition amongst them will
negatively impact their profits. If the five vendors met prior to submitting bids they may
reach an agreement to suppress their rivalry and share in the incremental profits from
doing so. The five bidders may agree that Bidder A will submit the low bid of $187.50
per chair and each of the other four bidders will submit bids ranging from $190 to $230
per chair. Each of the four losing bidders may be compensated by Bidder A for
suppressing their rivalry with direct cash payments, subcontracts, or agreements for other
bidders to be the designated winners on future procurements.
The explicit collusion just described is clandestine, unknown to the purchasing
firm. The five bidders are pretending to act competitively in the submission of their bids.
The purchasing firm, who does not know there is collusion by the bidders and is relying
on competition to reveal information about what should be paid for 2,000 chairs, believes
that the price of $187.50 per chair has been revealed through legitimate competition to be
the lowest price that can be paid for the chairs. At that price, the firm may buy 2,000
chairs, but not more. An important incremental loss from the collusion is the reduction in
the number of chairs purchased. At the competitive price of $125 the firm bought 2,200
chairs, but at a price of $187.50 the firm buys 200 fewer chairs. Mutually beneficial
transactions are not occurring due to the collusion by the bidders. This is a social loss.
The fundamental points of the chair purchase example above are not special – they apply
across all products and markets. Antitrust laws are designed to prevent, or at least
mitigate, the loss that occurs from the reduced output sold in the market as well as assure
market participants that competition will produce reliable price discovery. 64

C. The Machinery of Collusion
Cartels use various techniques to achieve price elevation and/or output reduction.
Naturally, cartels sometimes reach a simple agreement to fix an agreed price (or related
terms such as discounts, interest rates, credits, rebates etc.). For various reasons cartels
sometimes use highly related but alternative pathways to raise prices for example by

64 Antitrust law assumes there are not likely to be offsetting social gains that could excuse pricefixing. There are exceptional cases – collective rights organizations like ASCAP and BMI, or
restrictive agreements in patent licenses. See, BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Kaplow, supra note 50,
at 357; DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 30-32 (2017)
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1049793/ip_guidelines_2017.pdf.
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agreeing to output restrictions, allocation of customers or territories, or to rig bids at an
auction or procurement.
Antitrust law distinguishes illegal price fixing from merely parallel behavior and
requires that plaintiffs and prosecutors prove that the accused competitors reached an
agreement to fix prices. The agreement requirement is justified on the grounds that
merely parallel behavior is less likely to generate the high prices and output restrictions
that competitors can achieve via agreements to explicitly collude. Further, the risk of
chilling pro-competitive behavior is likely greater if the law attempts to regulate parallel
pricing in the absence of agreement. 65 Thus, a key assumption supporting this distinction
is that successful collusion is unlikely unless the firms communicate and reach an
agreement.
Explicit collusion is different from tacit coordination. Tacit coordination in an
oligopoly with firms that recognize their mutual interdependence is just rational noncooperative interaction. On the other hand, an agreement among competitors that relies
on interfirm communication and/or transfers to suppress rivalry is explicit collusion, and
we refer to the firms involved in the conspiracy as a cartel. 66 The communication
regarding the agreement can occur at the initiation phase of the explicit collusion and also
at the implementation phase. 67
Since explicit collusion is illegal the agreement must be self-enforcing. Put
differently, during the course of the conspiratorial agreement each co-conspirator will be
contemplating if their own profits can be increased by not complying with the agreement.
But non-compliance that is observable to fellow co-conspirators will potentially result in
punitive actions within the cartel or even the dissolution of the agreement. After the
initial collusive agreement is implemented further communication may be required to
counter the temptation of cartel members to cheat.68 Therefore, secret non-compliance is
the central problem of all cartels.
65 In theory monopoly prices could be achieved by tacit coordination and such parallel behavior is
outside the scope of the price fixing prohibition. The pragmatic judgment made by antitrust law is
that the expected costs from chilling desirable behavior exceed the expected gains from deterring
tacit collusion.
66 See MARSHALL & MARX, supra note 54, at ix. Recent research illustrates how communication can be
used to support output restriction and price increases. See Gaurab Aryal, Federico Ciliberto, &
Benjamin T. Leyden, Public Communication and Collusion in the Airline Industry, (Feb. 12, 2018)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3123972. The authors study communications
used in the airline industry to communicate plans to reduce capacity on competitive routes.
Specifically, they find that earnings calls from top managers to the investing public contained
comments about capacity that served as a communications channel between competing airlines. The
capacity comments apparently convey information about demand conditions that is hard for other
airlines to observe directly. Their econometric analysis indicates “that when all legacy carriers
operating in an airport-pair market communicated about capacity discipline in a given quarter, the
average number of seats offered in those markets decreased by 1.45% in the next quarter.” Id. at 4.
67 For a discussion of this distinction see Edward J. Green, Robert C. Marshall & Leslie M. Marx, Tacit
Collusion in Oligopoly, OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (2014).
68 Cartel stability is promoted by frequent exchange of price, quantity and other information. When
information is not exchanged or exchanged infrequently, then cartel members are less certain of
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An illustration may be helpful. Suppose that a homogeneous product is made by
four firms and some smaller foreign fringe firms, where the four large firms produce 85%
of total world output. Initially, the four firms are not in a cartel and the price in the
market place is $10 per unit. The four firms meet and agree that they will all be better off
selling at $25 per unit. 69 So, each cartel firm announces a new price of $25. But, the
buyers of such a product are not passive in paying the higher price, especially the larger
buyers. Suppose a large buyer that has typically bought from firm A approaches firm B
and offers to buy a large quantity at a price of $20. Since it had been profitable to sell at
$10 it is even more profitable to sell at $20. Firm B’s only introspective question is
whether the sale to the large buyer would be detected by the other cartel firms. Certainly,
firm A will know that it lost the business of the large buyer, but to whom? Did the large
buyer acquire most of its needs from foreign fringe firms or was there a defection by a
cartel firm? If firm B’s defection will go undetected then it will take advantage of the
opportunity to sell incremental quantity to a new buyer. But the other cartel firms will be
receiving similar offers from buyers. Quickly the price in the market will not be $25 but
$20. As the price descends there will more offers by buyers at even lower prices. The
price will continue to descend towards $10. This is natural with unconstrained secret
deviations.
A cartel can be effective in mitigating secret deviations and thus generating a
sustainable material profit above non-collusive levels if it implements certain structures,
referred to as pricing, allocation, and enforcement structures. 70 Pricing structures include
explicitly coordinated price announcements, rigged bids, or quantity restrictions. Also, to
facilitate the implementation of these prices, the incentives of the sales staff may be
altered to “price before volume” from the standard incentive of seeking incremental
volume by undercutting rivals. Allocation structures refer to the division of the collusive
gain. These may include, but are not limited to, market share allocations, customer
allocations, geographic allocations, or combinations of the three. Allocation structures
also include transfers between firms to rectify inadvertent deviations from the agreement
or address new issues associated with the division of the collusive gain. Enforcement
structures include monitoring mechanisms that assure each cartel firm that others in the
agreement are keeping their commitments regarding pricing, quantities, and the sharing

whether a decline in the market price was caused by defection or unfavorable shift in demand. If
cartel members mistakenly fear others are cheating this may cause cooperation to unravel.
69 A cartel does not always need to seek a price increase. In industries where prices naturally fall
under competitive conditions, a cartel may instead attempt to slow the rate of decline. If the cartel is
effective, the price descent will be less severe than in the absence of explicit collusion as was the case
for DRAM products during that conspiracy. See European Commission Prohibition Decision 19 May
2010, Comp 38511/DRAM,
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/38511/38511_1813_8.pdf.
70 See MARSHALL & MARX, supra note 54, at Ch. 6. There are product/industry/markets where some
structures are in place prior to cartel formation so the cartel need not be concerned with the
implementation of those. For example, the requirements of the Federal Acquisition Regulations that
all bids be revealed at the end of a competitive bidding process eliminates the need for a cartel to
invest in ex post monitoring of bids for compliance with the cartel agreement.
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of the collusive gain. Investment in monitoring can be extensive. Enforcement structures
also include the penalties for breaches of the agreement.
If good collusive structures are in place then secret deviations can be greatly
mitigated. The collusive structures that are effective in one product/industry/market may
not be effective in another. It is obvious from the history of cartel agreements that a rich
diversity of cartel structures have been implemented.
When a cartel implements effective collusive structures there are conducts and
outcomes that emerge that are largely inconsistent with unilateral action but consistent
with explicitly coordinated action. These conducts and outcomes are above and beyond
parallel movements in price that could be occurring for legitimate unilateral reasons, and
thus they are referred to as “plus factors”. When the conducts and outcomes are such that
it is highly unlikely they are the product of unilateral action but, instead, are most likely
the result of explicit coordination to reduce interfirm rivalry, then they are referred to as
“super plus factors”. Kovacic et. al. (2011) enumerate seven examples of super plus
factors. 71 We will return to super plus factors in the policy recommendation section of the
paper.
The strength of the incentive to consider explicit collusion depends upon the
characteristics of a given product/industry/market. It is useful to organize thinking on this
issue through the use of Porter’s Five Forces. The center force is interfirm rivalry. The
perimeter forces are the threat of entry, the presence of good substitute products,
bargaining power of suppliers, and bargaining power of buyers. For a given
product/industry/market, the following perimeter forces lead to low profits

71 See Kovacic et al., supra note 63, at 393-436. The seven super plus factors identified by the authors
are as follows.
1. A subset of firms restricts production when prices and profits are relatively high or increasing.
2. Among a subset of producers, market shares, customer incumbency, or geographic dominance is
stable when the firms have excess capacity, and prices and profits are relatively high or
increasing.
3. A reliable predictive econometric model that accounts for all material noncollusive effects on
price, estimated using benchmark data where conduct was presumed noncollusive, produces
predictions of prices that do not explain the path of actual prices in the period or region of
potential collusion, at a specified high confidence level.
4. A firm or subset of firms has knowledge of the details of another firm’s transactions, production,
sales, and/or inventories where the latter firm would be competitively disadvantaged by
conveying that information unilaterally.
5. Firms engage in interfirm transactions that are transfers of resources and are largely void of
productive noncollusive motivations.
6. In an industry where the product made by different firms is largely homogeneous, there is a
discrete change in the intrafirm incentives of sales forces, across a subset of firms during a given
period, that shifts from the pursuit of market share to maintenance of elevated prices (such as a
shift to “price before volume”).
7. A subset of firms with an aggregate market share large enough to have dominant-firm market
power jointly engage in a dominant-firm conduct when no single firm has the market power to
act unilaterally as a dominant firm by engaging in that dominant-firm conduct.
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•
•
•
•

Entry is relatively easy
Good substitutes are available
Suppliers have bargaining power
Buyers have bargaining power.

The converse leads to high profits
•
•
•
•

Entry is difficult
There are no good substitutes
Suppliers have little bargaining power
Buyers have little bargaining power

If a given product/industry/market has perimeter forces that lead to high profits, but
the few firms in the industry are making a homogenous product and competing largely on
the basis of price, we then have a scenario where the suppression of rivalry through
explicit collusion potentially generates a large payoff. The perimeter forces are like a
protective wall that the firms can take advantage of if they just bring their interfirm
rivalry under control. Bringing interfirm rivalry under control does little good if there is a
gaping hole in the wall such as the availability of very good substitutes, extremely low
entry barriers, or powerful buyer resistance. If the product is differentiated and
competition is largely not based on price there can still be plenty of profit opportunities
from explicit collusion if the wall is high enough, albeit the suppression of rivalry may be
more complicated.
Often cartels are not all-inclusive. An outside firm may have been asked to join
the cartel but chose not to, or, the cartel may not have invited some firms to join the
cartel. The presence of non-cartel firms can be corrosive to a cartel in the long-run. But if
a cartel is effective in suppressing interfirm rivalry amongst its members, then the cartel
may begin to function as a dominant firm. As a dominant firm it may exert pressure on
corrosive non-cartel firms to join the cartel or just try to eliminate them from the market.
Also, as cartel profits rise the protective wall of the perimeter forces may become
a focus of attention. For example, the cartel may invest in conducts to raise entry barriers
or degrade the perception of substitute products in the market.
As an extra source of incremental profits, sophisticated cartels sometimes
implement policies that discourage entry. These policies include capacity investments,
lobbying for favorable laws and regulations, or making some other investment that
preserves their cartel profits by discouraging entry into the cartelized market.
Coordinating these investments is likely to require significant planning and
communication. 72 A similar need for communication may arise when a cartel decides to
respond to potential or actual entry. For example, in the global alkali cartel of the
interwar era a leading cartel member predatorily cut prices in the local market of a South
As noted in the introduction to this Section, the difficulties associated with successful cartel
formation and operations can be significant.
72
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American entrant 73 and it then contacted another cartel member that was irritated by the
price cut to explain the cut was temporary and was being used to drive out an entrant. 74
Extensive communication is often important for a stable and profitable cartel, but
it is also a major hazard. Records of cartel communications are used to establish the
agreement required to prove a price fixing violation. As the volume of communication
grows so does the risk of detection. 75 Clever price-fixers think carefully about the tradeoff between the profit maximizing cartel structure and the desire to minimize the risk of
cartel detection and conviction of cartel members. One of the main contributions of this
Article, which we develop in Section IV, is an analysis of how this trade-off is improved
for cartelists who are active in more than one market.

D. Limits to Deterrence
Antitrust enforcers are pleased when they successfully prosecute price fixing, but
the overarching goal is to deter price fixing so that prosecution is unnecessary. Becker
observed that rational violation of the law can be deterred if sufficiently large expected
penalties are imposed on violators. Expected penalties are determined by the probability
of detection and conviction, and the magnitude of the penalty. Thus, antitrust law can
deter rational price fixers if the penalties and the probabilities of detection and conviction
are sufficiently large. 76 In this Article we explore reforms that tailor enforcement policy
to better deter serial collusion by large multi-product firms.
Obviously, a low probability of detection does not necessarily preclude effective
deterrence of price fixing. As long as any cartel can be detected with positive probability
then very large penalties can be chosen to make the expected penalty large enough to
deter. Block and Sidak addressed this issue and facetiously asked: “Why Not Hang a
Price Fixer Now and Then?” 77 We don’t and we won’t. Thus, the initial task for antitrust
scholars is to explain the limits on the magnitude of penalties.

A cartel member cut its price in Argentina in response to a threat of entry by an Argentine firm. See
Stocking & Watkins, supra note 1, at 437.
74 Id.
75 It is easy to understand why the risk of detection and conviction increases with the volume of
cartel communication. More communication likely means more people become aware of the cartel
and more incriminating documents or recordings are produced and stored. This increases the risk
that an innocent insider will discover and expose the cartel and the risk that a cartel investigation
started for some other reason will uncover damming evidence of the agreement.
76 See William M. Landes, (1983), Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 652
(1983); CONNOR supra note 8 at x (“In the case of collusive group crimes like price-fixing, deterrence
means that companies or individuals, after weighing the probable gains versus expected losses
associated with overt collusion, decide that it would be less profitable to form a cartel (or join an
existing cartel) than to adopt a form of business conduct that does not involve illegal manipulation of
markets.”)
77 Michael K. Block & Joseph Gregory Sidak, The Cost of Antitrust Deterrence: Why Not Hang a Price
Fixer Now and Then? 68 GEO. L. J. 131, 138-39 (1980)
73
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Fairness and efficiency both support limits on maximum penalties. Penalties must
be proportional to the culpability of the defendant to stay within the bounds of the Eighth
Amendment. Policymakers should be especially concerned about severity of penalties if
there is a risk of mistaken conviction. Harsh penalties may be inefficient if they crowd
out the possibility of implementing marginal deterrence of additional or aggravated
violations of the law. In the cartel setting, an escalating schedule of penalties might be
used to marginally deter firms who are colluding in product 1 from extending their
collusive agreement to product 2. Also, the incremental deterrent effect of increased
financial penalties disappears as defendants near the point of being judgment-proof.
Antitrust scholars most often cite concerns about the chilling effects of severe
antitrust sanctions as a reason to limit the severity of penalties. 78 The specter of severe
penalties combined with the possibility that competitive behavior could mistakenly be
labeled collusive by a court might discourage socially desirable behavior. 79 For example,
earnings calls by executives are possibly tools used to facilitate cartel behavior, but
generally, earnings calls provide socially valuable information to investors and improve
the efficiency of securities markets. Possibly aggressive pursuit of potential price-fixers
could chill disclosures in future earnings calls. 80
Expected penalties can be calibrated by adjusting the magnitude of penalties or by
adjusting the probability of detection and conviction. Adjustment of penalties is
straightforward, but it is less clear how to adjust probabilities of detection and conviction.
One possibility is to relax the rules characterizing behavior as price fixing to make it
easier to convict an alleged price-fixer. For example, the law could eliminate the
requirement that plaintiffs prove an agreement exists and simply provide evidence of
parallel behavior. Concern about over-breadth make this sort of reform unrealistic and we
will focus instead on choices by enforcement agencies that increase the probability of
discovering signs of collusion and evidence that could be used to establish agreement.
Historically, antitrust enforcers relied mostly on disclosures from insiders or
complaints from buyers to identify possible collusion. Enforcement agencies are poorly
positioned to access information suggestive of collusion. Successful cartels are careful to
hide their agreements and as best they can – hide the implementation of the agreement.
Economists have labored to identify collusion econometrically through publicly available
data, but thus far the research has not translated into significant improvements in agency
monitoring. There is one recent policy innovation that has generated many leads for
enforcement agencies – the leniency program, we will discuss that program in Section
IV.B.
Id.
Chilling effects also shape the types of proof relied on by antitrust courts. See, Kaplow supra note
50, at. 366 (“Whether and what sorts of chilling effects may arise depend on what forms of proof are
employed. Suppose, for example, that sudden, substantial price increases are considered as possible
evidence of coordinated oligopolistic price elevation.”)
80 Chilling effects are easy to describe but difficult to quantify. See, id. at 366 (“The chilling of
desirable behavior is a concern that strongly motivates past discussions of price-fixing rules but
almost always remains implicit, which makes it difficult to assess its importance and how the
magnitude of the problem is influenced by the nature of the rules that are adopted.”)
78
79
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Now that we have discussed policy tools that can be used to calibrate cartel
deterrence, we move to the question of whether deterrence is adequate today. The short
answer is – no one knows, we lack both theory and especially the data to answer that
question. We do want to make two crucial observations though. First, many antitrust
commentators worry that expected penalties are too low to adequately deter price
fixing. 81 And second, current analysis of deterrence is guided by analysis of price fixing
in the context of an isolated product or market. We conjecture that multi-product price
fixing is more difficult to deter than price fixing in an isolated product, and thus join the
ranks of commentators who favor more vigorous enforcement against cartels. 82
In Section IV we will explain that when multi-product competitors collude in
multiple products or markets they may be able to increase the stability and profitability of
their collusive agreement and possibly decrease the probability of detection. We explain
how multi-market price fixing provides benefits in terms of economies of scope, better
opportunities to hide the implementation of the collusive agreement and improved cartel
stability in the face of external shocks. 83
To preview the argument that deterrence is more difficult in the multi-product
context consider the following example. Suppose firms A, B, and C agree to fix prices of
product 1 and they each expect to earn $100 million from the agreement. Also, firms X,
Y, and Z agree to fix prices of product 2 and similarly they each expect to earn $100
million from the agreement. Suppose the probability of detecting the collusion in each
product is ¼. Then, a penalty on each firm greater than $400 million if they are caught
and convicted would be sufficient to deter a risk neutral decision maker acting on behalf
of each firm.
How does the story change if the firms merge in a pair-wise fashion so that A and
X combine, B and Y combine, and C and Z combine? If they choose to collude in only
one of the two products, then the analysis is unchanged. What if they choose to collude in
both products? Each merged firm earns $200 million from the collusive agreement. Let
us suppose that the penalty would be $800 million if they are caught and convicted of
collusion in both products. It is not so clear what the probability of detection and
conviction is likely to be in this new environment. Is it possible that competition
See e.g., William H. Page, Optimal Antitrust Remedies: A Synthesis, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, Volume 1 (eds. Roger D. Blair and D. Daniel Sokol) (2014) (“the
formula used to calculate fines is only weakly related to the optimal penalty.”) Kaplow, supra note 50,
at 370 (“Limited evidence to date suggests that the probability of detection is quite low.”)
82 Id. (“… even with substantial modern enforcement and penalties much stiffer than had existed in
the past, the existing level of deterrence may be insufficient. Indeed, even detected and punished
cartels may suffer little or realize net gains.”); Page, supra note 81, at x (compliance “programs may
be less effective in controlling price fixing than exclusionary practices, because price fixing is
necessarily clandestine... A manager may get the idea that he or she can surreptitiously fix prices and
enhance the profitability of his or her division (and compensation) without drawing the notice of
supervisors and antitrust counsel.”).
83 Much of our thinking runs parallel to the analysis by Bernheim and Whinston of multi-market
contact in the context of oligopoly pricing. See generally B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D.
Whinston, Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior, 21 RAND J. ECON. 1 (1990).
81
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authorities might detect collusion in one product, but not the other? If yes, how are the
probabilities of detection in each product related? Perhaps the probability of detection
declines because multi-product collusion is more stable, 84 or because tactics to evade
detection are more effective in the multi-product setting. 85 In Section IV we suggest that
the probability of detection may go down, and is not likely to rise very much. We also
conclude that the average duration and per period profit from collusion is likely to grow
and thus $200 million understates the gain from price fixing in both products 1 and 2.
Increased profit combined with a probability of detection that falls (or does not rise very
much) means that deterrence would be more difficult.

E. Deterrence of Owners, Top Management, and Middle Managers
Our discussion of collusion in hypothetical products 1 and 2 supposed that the
decision-maker who chose whether to collude was a faithful agent of the firm. Faithful in
the sense that the decision-maker acted based on the expected costs and benefits to the
firm. It may be the case that decisions to collude are made by managers who have
different objectives from the owners of the firm. In extreme cases a manager might
decide to collude because he or she will be rewarded for the short-term increase in firm
profit. The manager might not care much or at all about the expected costs from detection
especially if the manager plans to leave the firm soon. When these “rogue managers” are
responsible for collusion it might be difficult or impossible to deter collusion with
financial penalties on the firm.
Optimists believe that antitrust enforcement against cartels is functioning
effectively and when a cartel is detected they attribute it to a rogue manager. 86 They
believe that good corporate governance implies that top managers act on the preferences
of owners 87 and are adequately deterred from collusion given current enforcement
84 Cartel instability likely generates communications and defections that increase the probability of
detection.
85 For example, buyer resistance and complaints may be softer when buyers face rising prices in both
product 1 and 2. They may be more likely to attribute the general price rise to exogenous factors and
less likely to attribute it to collusion. On the other hand, multi-product price fixing may make
detection more likely because more parties are privy to cartel-related communications.
86 See e.g., Kiran Desai, Antitrust Compliance: The Effects of Perceived Regulatory Failure, EUROPEAN
ANTITRUST REVIEW 15, 17 (2010) (“In creating an antitrust programme it should be recognised that
there may be personnel who act in bad faith, for which no amount of education and admonition will
act as a deterrent. Sales targets and bonuses can be too much of an incentive to break the law. Indeed,
some may even go to great lengths to hide their activities from in-house counsel”.); Theodore Banks,
The Trouble With Antitrust Compliance and 10 Ways to Fix It, Corporate Counsel April 30, 2012
(expressing concern the price-fixing will arise through the actions of a rogue manager); Roger D.
Blair and D. Daniel Sokol, The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics 265 (2014)
87 The threat of shareholder derivative suits could be used to deter directors and top managers from
embracing price fixing agreements. Derivative suits might be effective tools of corporate governance
in this context. See John M. Connor, The Global Lysine Price-Fixing Conspiracy of 1992-1995, 19 REV.
AGRICULTURAL ECON. 412, 420 (1997) (“ADM settled shareholders' suits for $30 million”); James D.
Cox, The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 3, 44 (1999) (“The need for such an
inhibition was the basis raised in the petition for certiorari in California Public Employees'
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practices. The optimists typically endorse compliance training and criminal punishment
of rogue managers as enforcement tools that increase deterrence of rogues and mitigate
agency problems within firms that sometimes allow rogues to flourish.
We agree that compliance training and criminal punishment of price fixing
managers have social value as enforcement tools, but we also are concerned that
compliance training is sometimes used to teach managers how to collude, and that
penalties against rogue managers may be offset by indemnification or some form of
compensation to managers who suffer personal penalties after a collusive agreement is
uncovered. 88 Furthermore, we are critical of commentators who place too much emphasis
on the problem of rogue managers. 89 Widespread multi-product price fixing seems to be
inconsistent with the notion that rogue managers are responsible for collusion. 90
Retirement System v. Felzen. The derivative suit grew out of more than $190 million Archer Daniels
Midland (ADM) had paid to settle various civil and criminal antitrust cases for its alleged price fixing
activities. The derivative suits alleged ADM's officers and directors had breached their fiduciary
obligations in connection with the antitrust violations and sought to recover $190 million.”)
Unfortunately, empirical studies find that cartel member firms have less vigilant directors
than other firms and cartel employees exercise stock options more rapidly than employees in other
firms. See Paolo Buccirossi & Giancarlo Spagnolo, Corporate Governance and Collusive Behaviour
(2007) https://ssrn.com/abstract=1136675. Tolerance of collusion may affect the nature of
executive compensation. Spagnolo shows that capped bonus plans and incumbency rents for
managers encourage collusion by relaxing the incentive compatibility constraint. Giancarlo
Spagnolo, Managerial incentives and collusive behavior, 49 EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW1501–1523
(2005).
88 “Senior management in EU cartels does not seem to suffer from their participation in cartels. For
example, Robert Koehler became CEO of SGL Carbon in 2012, after being convicted in 1999 of pricefixing in the graphite electrodes cartel.” Marvão, supra note 31.
89 Harrington reviewed recent price-fixing investigations at the EU and found that in most cases top
management was involved in the collusion. See Joseph E Harrington Jr., A Proposal for a Structural
Remedy for Illegal Collusion 2 (July 31, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3038174. Connor notes:
“The evidence on convicted cartelists suggests that rogue managers are in a minority. Cartel
executives tend to have titles that place them in a company’s top layer of management.” CONNOR,
supra note 8, at fn 53. Harry First reviewed DOJ Antitrust Division press releases issued between
March 2014 and March 2016 and found forty-seven named individuals involved in “major
international cartels.” The industry distribution was: “twenty-seven in auto parts, seven in Libor,
seven in ocean shipping, five in cathode display tubes, one in marine hose….” “[N]ot one person
mentioned during this time period was in a low-level corporate position. Their described positions
varied—executive, general manager, group and department manager, high-level manager, director of
sales and marketing—and thirteen of them were identified either as president, CEO, owner, or
chairman. These are not line-level employees.” Harry First, Are Cartel Participants Rogues?, June
2016, www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/.../are-cartel-participants-rogues
90 Our case study of price fixing in the chemical industry highlights three facts about price-fixing in
the chemical industry that are hard to reconcile with the assumption that collusion is accomplished
strictly (or mostly) by middle managers: (1) repeated price-fixing, (2) coordination of price-fixing
across different product lines, and (3) the use of outside consultants for addressing the double
marginalization problem by coordinating cartel conduct between upstream and downstream cartels
and organizing other kinds of coordination. Levenstein, Marvão, & Suslow come to a similar
conclusion: “There are cases where a firm’s corporate culture encourages participation in cartels. In
such a case, the leadership of the organization expects managers to collude, and we observe collusion
in many markets in which the firm operates. Managers may learn to collude in one division and then
take those practices to another.” Margaret C. Levenstein, Catarina Marvão & Valerie Y. Suslow, SERIAL
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Returning to our earlier observation, we note again that the features of the
chemical cartel seem inconsistent with the notion that collusion arises independently at a
division level. It seems unlikely that three different rogue managers from a company like
BASF independently sought the services for Fides/AC Treuhand in aid of collusion.
Further, the ways that Fides/AC Treuhand coordinated the activities of chemical
manufacturers across different product lines suggests top management was likely
involved in these cartels. If we are right, then enforcement policies that worry very much
about addressing the problem of rogues are likely misguided.
We fear that inadequate deterrence means that top management and perhaps even
shareholders 91 sometimes welcome price fixing agreements as a tool for increasing
expected profits – even after factoring in the expected costs from detection and
punishment. 92 Our fear grows out of the evidence we discussed in Section II concerning
persistent serial collusion across a variety of industries. If top management is thoroughly
implicated in serial collusion then perhaps it would be desirable to impose tougher
sanctions on corporate officers responsible for price fixing. 93

IV.

Serial collusion by multi-product firms – why is it different?

Suppose a large multi-product firm manufactures and sells well over fifty
products and suppose that the same firm is engaged in explicit collusion with rivals at any
point in time in ten of those products. The large multi-product firm can clearly treat each
cartel as a separate independent collusive activity, and thus the analysis of the previous
section would be directly relevant, ten times. However, by viewing the ten cartels
together, and solving cartel problems across the ten cartels, or some subset of those
cartels, the large multi-product firm can increase the aggregate profitability of the ten
cartels, decrease detection risk, and resolve the problems of a given cartel more easily.

COLLUSION IN CONTEXT: REPEAT OFFENSES BY FIRM OR BY INDUSTRY?, December 18, 2015,
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/GF(2015)12
&docLanguage=En
91 If deterrence is sufficient to make price-fixing unattractive to shareholders then good corporate
governance would be the key to inducing top management to take the steps necessary to stop price
fixing. There is evidence that good governance, in the form of a significant presence of outside
directors on the Board leads to better cooperation with cartel enforcers once collusion is found. See
Murillo Campello, Daniel Ferrés & Gaizka Ormazabal, Whistle-Blowers on the Board? The Role of
Independent Directors in Cartel Prosecutions, 60 J. LAW & ECON. 241, 244 (2017).
92 “In such a case, the leadership of the organization expects managers to collude, and collusion
occurs in many markets in which the firm operates. Firm norms and expectations of managerial
behavior can repeatedly encourage collusion and “disregard” previous fines, as illustrated in the ADM
case (Eichenwald, 2000).” Marvão, supra note 31.
93 “Imposing tougher sanctions, such as individual prison sentences or disqualification of senior
executives from employment in their sector or role, may prevent repeated collusive behaviors (in
new firms) and thus, increase deterrence levels.” Id.
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A. Resolving the Issues of a Given Cartel across Cartels
Serial multi-product cartels are likely to be more resilient to economic shocks and
defection by cartel members who may be tempted to depart from the cartel or cheat other
cartel members. One reason is that multi-product cartel members that defect face stronger
punishment – the potential loss of cartel profit in multiple products, not just one. 94
Alternatively, cartels may find it easier to mollify potential defectors by making sidepayments in one product to offset losses they might suffer in another product. Multimarket contact provides greater opportunities to hide these side payments from antitrust
enforcers; they may be disguised in subcontracts, joint marketing arrangements or patent
licenses. The opportunities for such hidden transfers may exist in single-product cartels
but they are likely to be more available and can take more complex forms in multiproduct cartels.

94 Bernheim and Whinston explain how multimarket contact facilitates price fixing by strengthening
the threat of punishment faced by potential defectors – if a firms defects in one market then it will
suffer in the future when it gets punished in the market in which it defected but also in other markets
in which it is participating in a cartel. See Bernheim & Whinston, supra note 83, at 6-11. Econometric
research largely confirms the role of multimarket contact in facilitating higher prices, but the
research has looked at firms competing across a number of geographic markets rather across
different product lines. Bernheim and Whinston’s model suggests the effects are likely to be stronger
across product lines assuming that various product lines are more heterogeneous than various
geographic markets.
Hay and Kelley examine all U.S. price fixing cases from 1963 to 1972 and find that collusion
in one geographic market is associated with collusion in other geographic markets. George A. Hay
and Daniel Kelley, An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies, 17 J. L. & Econ. 13, 27-28 (1974).
Work finding that multimarket contact across separate geographic markets leads to higher prices
includes: Ivette Jans & David I. Rosenbaum, Multimarket Contact and Pricing: Evidence from the US
Cement Industry, 15 INT’L J. INDUSTRIAL ORG. 391 (1994) (multimarket contact associated with higher
cement prices); William N. Evans & Ioannis N. Kessides, Living by the “Golden Rule”: Multimarket
Contact in the U. S. Airline Industry, 109 Q. J. ECON. 341 (1994) (multimarket contact tends to increases
airline ticket prices); Philip M. Parker & Lars-Hendrik Roller, Collusive Conduct in Duopolies:
Multimarket Contact and Cross-Ownership in the Mobile Telephone Industry, 46 RAND. J. ECON. 301
(1997) (multimarket contact associated with higher prices in the mobile phone industry); Nerea
Fernandez & Pedro L. Marin, Market Power and Multimarket Contact: Some Evidence from the Spanish
Hotel Industry, 28 J. INDUSTRIAL ECON. 304 (1998) (multimarket contact associated with higher prices
in the Spanish hotel market); Meghan R. Busse, Multimarket Contact and Price Coordination in the
Cellular Telephone Industry, 9 J. ECON. & MANAG. STRATEGY 287 (2000) (multimarket contact associated
with a pattern of setting higher identical prices across markets); Federico Ciliberto & Jonathan W.
Williams, Does multimarket contact facilitate tacit collusion? Inference on conduct parameters in the
airline industry, 45 RAND J. ECON. 764 (2014) (carriers with a significant amount of multimarket
contact can sustain “near-perfect” cooperation in setting fares); Haizhen Lin & Ian M. McCarthy,,
Multimarket Contact in Health Insurance: Evidence from Medicare Advantage, NBER Working Papers
24486 (2018) (multimarket contact responsible for higher health insurance premia). But Waldfogel
and Wulf find only a small effect on radio advertising revenue. See, Joel Waldfogel & Julie Wulf ,
Measuring the Effect of Multimarket Contact on Competition: Evidence from Mergers Following Radio
Broadcast Ownership Deregulation, 5 BE J. ECON. ANALYSIS & POLICY article 17 (2006).
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The European Commission noted in the vitamins conspiracy decision that BASF
exited the production of thiamin (vitamin B1) in 1989. 95 At the same time, Roche, who
was a duopolist in the production of beta carotene, accommodated the expansion of
BASF’s market share of beta carotene from 12% of worldwide market in 1988 to 17% in
1989, and an average share of 22% for 1990 to 1998. 96 The Commission decision does
not connect these two events. However, a unilateral decision by BASF to exit thiamin
production in the midst of a conspiracy that would have increased thiamin profits does
not make sense. 97 Furthermore, it makes little more sense for Roche to unilaterally
accommodate the expansion of beta carotene production by BASF when Roche was
dominant in that product, and thereby erode near-monopoly profits. More plausibly there
was a mutual agreement among the two leading vitamin cartel firms to have one exit the
thiamine market and get compensated with accommodation of their share expansion in
the beta carotene market. 98
Coordinated product exit/contraction and entry/expansion is difficult to observe.
For large multi-product serial colluders, exit from a single product line and entry into a
different product line would likely be viewed as immaterial, and thus not included in
filings to the SEC or other regulatory bodies. But we have some window into this
potential tactic through European Commission cartel decisions. The four chemical cartel
cases listed below featured exit by a large multi-product cartel participant from one of the
cartelized markets in the midst of the explicit collusion. Given a well-functioning cartel,
it is unlikely that the cartel price was so low that continued sales were unprofitable for the
exiting firm. 99 It also seems unlikely that the exit was rooted in a fear of being caught,
especially since the exiting firm joined the cartel at or near its inception. Given that each
of the exiting firms is a potential serial colluder, it seems unlikely that collusion was
discovered internally in the midst of the collusion and upper management insisted on exit
from the product in question. In this light we conjecture a cartel portfolio explanation –
namely, there is some hidden countervailing transaction in another product, perhaps
accommodated entry, that compensates these firms for exiting the products listed below.
• For the Butadiene Rubber and ESBR cartel, the duration of the infringement was
5/20/1996 to 11/28/2002.100 Shell and Dow were participants in the cartel at the
“BASF ceased its own production of vitamin B1 in 1989 but continued to act as a major supplier
selling product bought in from other producers.” (EC Decision in Vitamins at para. 84) BASF
continued to bid for Thiamin business. When it won a contract the order would be fulfilled by Roche.
96 Expert Report of B. Douglas Bernheim, p. 93, M.D.L. No. 1285, In Re: Vitamins Antitrust Litigation,
Misc. No. 99-0197 (TFH), May 24, 2002. This report was submitted as exhibit number and filed in the
District Court of the District of Columbia. We obtained the document through a request to the law
clerk to Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan. The document was made available based on D.C. Local Civil
Rule 79.2 and the United States District Court for the District of Columbia's policy of not retaining
exhibits that are admitted into evidence at trial in civil cases.
97 See Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx & Matthew E. Raiff, Cartel Price Announcements: The
Vitamins Industry, 26 INT’L J. INDUSTRIAL ORG. 762 (2008) (discussing circumstantial economic
evidence that the vitamins conspiracy started in 1985).
98 A similar finding can be found in Zhou, supra note 15, at 382 (EC investigation of one market
decreases entry and increases exit from other cartelized markets.)
99 We do not observe the price at which the transactions occurred.
100 EC Decision in Butadiene Rubber and Emulsion Styrene Butadiene Rubber at Article 1 in Decsion, p.
62
95
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•

•

•

start. Shell’s market share was larger than Dow’s. Nevertheless, Shell sold its
entire synthetic rubber business to Dow in the middle of 1999. 101
For the Methacrylates cartel, the duration of the infringement was 1/23/1997 to
9/12/2002. 102 ICI, Degussa, and Elf Aquitaine were participants from the start.
Nevertheless, ICI sold the entirety of its business to Lucite on 11/1/1999, and
from that date forward Lucite was a participant in the cartel. 103
For the MCAA cartel, the duration of the infringement was 1/1/1984 to
5/7/1999. 104 Akzo, Arkema., Elf Aquitaine and Hoechst were participants from
the start. Nevertheless, Hoechst sold its MCAA business to Clariant on 7/1/1997
and then Clariant participated in the cartel until 5/7/1999. 105
For the Polypropylene cartel, the duration of infringement was 1977 to 1983. 106
Rhone Poulenc was a member of the cartel from the start, however, Rhone
Poulenc sold its polypropylene business to BP in 1980. 107

Besides using coordinated entry and exit decisions to reallocate cartel profit
across cartel members, multi-product cartels can use joint ventures, subcontracts, and
patent licenses to reallocate profits internally. Joint ventures were common among
members of recent electronics cartel. For example, LG began participation in the cathode
ray tube cartel in December of 1997. In April of 2001 it formed a production joint
venture with another cartel member, Phillips, and the joint venture became a cartel
member. When cartel members form production and marketing joint ventures that
displace their own production and marketing of a cartel product it provides a great
opportunity to adjust output and reallocate cartel profit. By comparing European
Commission cartel decisions to joint venture approvals we were able to identify six other
joint ventures between electronics cartel members covering a cartelized product that
started before or during the cartel: NEC and Hitachi joint venture in DRAMs, LG and
Phillips joint venture in LCDs, Hitachi and Mitsubishi joint venture in smart card chips,
Hitachi and LG joint venture in optical disk drives, Toshiba and Samsung joint venture in
optical disk drives, and Sony and NEC joint venture in optical disk drives. 108
Joint ventures may be subject to regulatory scrutiny and we would hope that a
vigilant competition authority would not approve joint ventures that facilitate cartel
activity, 109 but the other tactics for reallocating cartel profits are not likely to face
EC Decision in Butadiene Rubber and Emulsion Styrene Butadiene at para. 286
EC Decision in Methacrylates at Article 1 in Decision, p. 74
103 EC Decision in Methacrylates at para. 30
104 EC Decision in MCAA at Article 1 in Decision, p. 63
105 EC Decision in MCAA at para. 16
106 EC Decision in Polypropylene at Article 1 in Decision, p. 36
107 EC Decision in Polypropylene at para. 19
108 We counted more than fifteen other joint ventures involving firms that were members of the
electronics cartel but the joint ventures did not consolidate production or sales between the cartel
members. These joint ventures can also be used to reallocate cartels profits assuming the joint
ventures generated a profit, the parties can always agree to any profit share or cost share they desire.
109 The Europe Commission does not have a good track record on this front. See, Leslie M. Marx & Jun
Zhou, The Dynamics of Mergers Among (Ex)Co-Conspirators in the Shadow of Cartel Enforcement,
(March 2014), TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2014-013, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2416893, (“[I]n
101
102
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regulatory scrutiny. Exit/contraction properly crafted, is not reviewable by any regulatory
authorities. 110 Entry/expansion is invariably viewed as a unilateral decision of a firm that
is considered to be part of the normal workings of the marketplace. Thus, coordinated
exit/contraction and entry/expansion decisions are almost invisible to enforcement
authorities. Also, we are unaware of any inquiry regarding such conduct in civil
litigation. 111 Patent licenses have been used to implement cartels and cross-licensing
agreements can certainly be used to reallocate profit within a cartel. 112 Subcontracts are
sometimes used to reallocate cartel profit, 113 but really any sort of contract relationship
between cartel members might serve that purpose. When multi-product serial colluders
enjoy a dense set of contractual relationships (joint ventures, patent licenses,
subcontracts, or other) it makes it easier to hide cartel side-payments, and, as a bonus to
the cartel, the threat of losing these other contractual relationships in response to cheating
helps stabilize cartels.
A different sort of benefit that arises from serial multi-product collusion concerns
strategies that reduce the risk of cartel detection. Multi-product cartels can better hide
price increases from buyers compared to single-product collusion. Buyer resistance to
price increases may diminish because multi-product collusion can remove the
competitive benchmarks that buyers use to make judgments about the presence of a
cartel. They have more trouble judging whether a price is “too high” and whether price
increases are the result of cartelization or some other cause. Coordinating price increases
across multiple products enhances the credibility of sellers’ assurances that price
increases are grounded in genuine overall cost and demand pressures. A procurement
division of a large buyer that gets a common justification for price increases across
multiple products lines may be more willing to accept the price increases than resist
them.

B. Strategic Use of Amnesty to Punish Deviators – the “Chain Store Paradox”
for Serial Multi-Product Colluders 114
A different version of our argument about more vigorous punishment in multiproduct cartels is based on antitrust leniency programs. The leniency program allows a
cartel member to avoid criminal liability for price fixing by making the first disclosure of
the cartel to enforcement officials. In a single-product setting this policy works well to

over one-third of the cartels discovered by the European Commission … between 1985 and 2012,
conspirators sold majority shares or relocated major production and sales capacities to their coconspirators.”)
110 If exit occurs through a merger or takeover then it is reviewable. But a multi-product firm can
often convert a production process for one product into that for another. Or, alternatively, sell off
piecemeal the capital stock.
111 And even if such an inquiry were made it would likely remain unanswered on the grounds of
being beyond the scope of the current cartel inquiry.
112 See U.S. v. Line Material 333 U.S. 287, (1948); U.S. v. Harford Empire, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
113 See MARSHALL & MARX, supra note 54, at 16-17.
114 See generally, Richard Selten, The Chain Store Paradox, 9 THEORY & DECISION 127 (1978).
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destabilize cartels. 115 In the case of serial multi-product collusion, it might be used by a
prominent cartel member to punish defectors by sacrificing collusive profit in one
product, with the goal of strengthening the punishment threat and the stability of the
cartel in another product.
Amnesty is typically characterized as a race to the antitrust authority, where the
payoff for being first to admit to a conspiracy is the absence of a fine, provided that
compelling evidence of a conspiracy is put forward. In other words, it is typically seen as
a unilateral decision with no benefit to the amnesty awardee beyond the current cartel in
question. However, if the amnesty applicant is a large multi-product firm that is running
tens of cartels in diverse products, is there a benefit to amnesty beyond the one cartel for
which it sought amnesty? Often large multi-product firms engage in explicit collusion
with smaller firms, perhaps firms that make a single product. A large multi-product firm
may be involved in a cartel in vitamins, a cartel in concrete additives, and a cartel in
synthetic rubber. Small single product firms in each of the cartels may make only a
certain range of vitamin products, or only concrete additives, or only synthetic rubber.
There is no reason to believe that these smaller firms would have knowledge of cartels in
other products, and these firms may not even be aware that the large multi-product firms
in their cartel makes these other products.
Recall that the central problem of explicit collusion is – cheating by members. If a
small cartel firm with an 8% market share within the cartel cheats on the cartel
agreement, expanding its market share to as much as 10%, it may not be worthwhile for a
large multi-product firm with a within-cartel share of 40% to punish the deviating smaller
firm. Across tens of cartels this kind of conduct by small single product firms can be, in
aggregate, very costly in terms of foregone collusive profits to the large multi-product
cartel firm. Prior to amnesty, how would a large multi-product serial colluding firm
mitigate this kind of conduct by small single product firms? A punishment within one
cartel would be almost surely invisible to any other cartel since the small single product
firms operate in different product markets. Even intentionally revealing a cartel to
authorities would not get much attention since prior to amnesty such an action would
likely be viewed as an accidental detection or a one-off incident.
However, amnesty can be used by a large multi-product firm to greatly mitigate
cheating by small single product firms across its portfolio of cartels. The European
Commission makes it clear in their decisions who is receiving full amnesty and their
decisions are in the public domain. It is reasonable to presume that any small firm that is
engaged in a conspiracy with a large multi-product firm will be aware that their large
Theoretical work shows that well designed leniency programs facilitate cartel detection in the
single-product setting. For a survey, see Giancarlo Spagnolo, Leniency and Whistleblowers in Antitrust,
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5794(August 2006), https://ssrn.com/abstract=936400. Poorly designed
leniency programs that are too generous to cartel members undercut deterrence. There is reason to
be concerned that the EU may be too generous with its grants of leniency. “[A] firm received a 100
percent reduction in the fine through the leniency program in 55 (54 percent) of the 101 products in
which firms were prosecuted” in the EU between 2001 and 2012. Leslie M. Marx, Claudio Mezzetti &
Robert C. Marshall, Antitrust Leniency with Multiproduct Colluders, 7 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL:
MICROECONOMICS 205 (2015).
115
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multi-product co-conspirator has sought amnesty in a different cartelized product. In light
of this information, the small single product firm will likely inquire of their large multiproduct co-conspirator why they took such an action. The large multi-product firm will
explain that they are not willing to tolerate deviations by small firms in their cartels and
when these deviations occur they will seek amnesty.
This reputation for toughness by the large multi-product serial colluders can have
two benefits for cartel payoffs. 116 First, cheating by small co-conspirators will be
substantially deterred across their entire portfolio of cartels. Second, if there are products
that the large serial colluding firm wants to cartelize, but smaller firms in that industry
have been reluctant because they believe cheating by others will greatly reduce cartel
payoffs making the prospective venture not worth the risk, then for those products, cartels
will be more likely to form. One would expect a large multi-product serial colluder to
account for the external benefits to other existing and potential cartels when seeking
amnesty in a single cartel.
This line of argument might explain why two multi-product chemical firms, Akzo
Nobel and Degussa, applied for and received full amnesty in particular chemical product
cartels. First, Akzo sought amnesty for a cartel in which Degussa was a member. 117 But
Akzo and Degussa were participating in more than that one cartel together at the time of
the Akzo amnesty application. If Akzo was motivated by the standard unilateral logic for
seeking amensty, why didn’t Akzo report the other cartels at that time? Shortly thereafter
Degussa sought and received full amnesty for their participation in a second cartel in
which Akzo was a participant. 118 Note that the cartels in which Akzo and Degussa were
participating at the time did not end when Akzo first applied for amnesty. Soon after
Degussa’s application for amnesty in the second product Akzo applied for and received
amnesty for yet a third cartel, which begs the question why didn’t Degussa report the
cartel in the third product when it applied for amnesty in the second product? 119 It is a
reasonable conjecture that Akzo and Degussa were working together to send warning
signals to deviant firms. It is also reasonable to conjecture that Akzo and Degussa applied
for leniency in the markets sequentially to escalate the punishment, alternating
applications to share the benefit from leniency.

See Shigeki Isogai & Chaohai Shen, Multiple Cartels and Strategic Use of the Leniency Policy,
Working Paper, 2017 for a model where a multi-product firm uses amnesty to signal intolerance for
deviant conduct to members of its many other cartels. “Marvão (2015) shows that repeat offenders
appear to receive larger EC leniency reductions, which suggests that firms can learn the “rules of the
game”, colluding repeatedly and reporting the cartel to reduce their penalties. As such, fines need to
be tougher and recidivism needs to be dealt with differently.” Marvão, supra note 31. See also, Robert
C. Marshall & Leslie M. Marx, Participation in Multiple Cartels Through Time and the Potentially
Strategic Use of Leniency, Working Paper, October 2015.
117 Akzo received full amnesty in Organic Peroxides (EC Decision in Organic Peroxides at paras. 50506)
118 Degussa received full amnesty in Hydrogen Peroxide and Perborate (EC Decision in Hydrogen
Peroxide and Perborate at para. 501)
119 Akzo received full amnesty in Calcium Carbide (EC Decision in Calcium Carbide at paras. 335-36)
116
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C. Monitoring Compliance with Cartel Rules is Likely an Increasing Returns
Technology
Economies of scale and scope are an easy to understand advantage of serial multiproduct collusion. Likely, there are efficiencies associated with monitoring the actions of
cartel members across multiple related product lines. In other words, checking firm A’s
prices for products 1 and 2 is probably less than twice as costly as simply checking firm
A’s price for product 1. Next, colluders and their allies (like Fides/AC Treuhand) likely
get better at managing collusion with experience. Some aspects of corporate culture,
corporate organization, and corporate incentives that work to stabilize collusion in
product 1 may be transferred to product 2. 120 Finally, developing and using outside cartel
consultants, like Fides/AC Treuhand, should be easier and less costly on a per cartel
basis. 121
In the recently prosecuted chemical cartels the association management company
Fides/AC Treuhand helped the colluding firms capture these benefits from economies of
scale and scope. Fides/AC Treuhand gathered monthly reports on production, sales, and
pricing. with the right to verify these reports via audit if necessary. It then disseminated
the aggregate data to cartel members and advised the members about the health of the
cartel. 122 On occasion, Fides/AC Treuhand served as a sort of a court to resolve disputes
between cartel members. We conjecture that Fides/AC Treuhand was especially helpful
to the cartel in dealing with disputes that arose when a cartelized chemical was used as an
See Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 30 at 8 (“There are cases where a firm’s corporate culture
encourages participation in cartels. In such a case, the leadership of the organization expects
managers to collude, and we observe collusion in many markets in which the firm operates.
Managers may learn to collude in one division and then take those practices to another. Firm norms
and expectations of managerial behavior can encourage collusion, as the well-known ADM case
illustrated (Eichenwald 2000). Van Driel (2000) analyzes the role that cultural and organizational
factors played in a study of four European transportation cartels.”) See also Hugo Van Driel, Collusion
in transport: group effects in a historical perspective, 41 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 385 (2000); KURT
EICHENWALD, THE INFORMANT: A TRUE STORY(2000).
121 See, Rick Busscher, Martin Herz, & Hans Vedder, The Shortest Competition Judgment Ever; AC
Treuhand II, European Law Blog, Nov. 9, 2015, http://europeanlawblog.eu/2015/11/09/theshortest-competition-judgment-ever-ac-treuhand-ii/ (“…as with any cartel, there needs to be
supervision and enforcement. This is tricky for cartelists themselves, as the supervisor is exposed to
the risk of being qualified as a ringleader, negating the possibility of immunity under the Leniency
Guidelines. Hence, the heat stabilisers cartel thought of a better way, namely hiring an independent
firm to ensure that parties stick to the cartel.”)
122 We expect that the information sharing fostered by Fides/AC Treuhand helped chemical firms
coordinate on the initiation of cooperative pricing and to monitor for deviations. Shared information
reduces the possibility of the misinterpretation of market-wide data. Recent papers by Awaya and
Krishna and Spector show that information sharing among firms improves their ability to support
elevated prices. Awaya and Krishna emphasize that information sharing improves monitoring, which
reduces uncertainty and allows greater profits from coordination. See Yu Awaya & Vijay Krishna, On
Communication and Collusion, 106 AMER. ECON. REV. 285 (2016). Spector emphasizes that information
sharing allows firms to detect deviations more quickly, making deviations less profitable and so
reducing the incentive for firms to deviate in the first place. See David Spector, Facilitating collusion
by exchanging non-verifiable sales reports. PSE Working Papers n° 2015-07 (2015),
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01119959/document.
120
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input in the manufacture of another chemical by a cartel member. When one cartel
member buys a product from another cartel member it is likely the seller will discount the
price to the buyer, but the buyer would be expected to provide some form of
compensation to the seller. 123
The involvement of Fides/AC Treuhand 124 in the implementation and operation of
cartels is well documented in European Commission decisions, and this involvement can
be characterized as substantial. The Organic Peroxide decision at paragraph 92 makes it
abundantly clear that Fides/AC Treuhand had a thorough understanding of the pricing,
allocation, and enforcement structures needed to avert secret deviations within the
Organic Peroxide cartel and knew how to translate that understanding into actionable
steps for the members of the cartel. 125

Economists have identified an inefficiency called double marginalization that arises from
successive monopolies. A cartel can increase overall profit by responding to this inefficiency.
124 We refer to the firm as Fides/AC Treuhand because, “AC Treuhand is the result of a 1993
management-buyout of the division offering association-management within a company called Fides
Trust AG.” (EC Organic Peroxide decision at para 20)
125 Role in explicit collusion (from EC OP Decision at para 92):
• organised meetings of the members of the agreement, often in Zurich;
• produced, distributed and recollected the so called ‘pink’ and ‘red’ papers with the
agreed market shares which were, because of their colour, easily distinguishable
from other meeting documents and were not allowed to be taken outside the AC
Treuhand premises;
• calculated the ‘pluses and minuses’, i.e. the deviations from the agreed market shares,
which were used for compensations;
• reimbursed the travel expenses of the participants, in order to avoid traces of these
meetings in the companies’ accounts;
• collected data on OP sales and provided the participants with the relevant statistics;
• stored the original agreement from 1971 and other relevant documents concerning
the agreement in its safe and handed them over to PC;
• acted as a moderator in case of tensions between the members of the agreement and
encouraged the parties to find compromises. AC Treuhand would try to stimulate the
parties to work together and reach an agreement. ‘The message from AC Treuhand
was that it would get worse for the participants if they discontinued the discussions.’ ;
• was actively involved in reshaping the arrangement among producers in 1998 during
a bilateral meeting in Amersfoort between Akzo representatives and [...] of AC
Treuhand. During this bilateral meeting a solution aimed at meeting Atochem’s
demand was developed. The solution consisted of a proposal of AC Treuhand for the
new quotas;
• AC Treuhand advised the parties whether or not to allow other participants into the
agreement;
• instructed all participants on the legal dangers of parts of these meetings and on
what measures to take to avoid detection of these arrangements' bearing on Europe;
• participated mainly the ‘summit’ meetings but at least at once instance in the nineties
attended also a working group meeting
• according to Akzo chaired at least some of the meetings, (AC Treuhand sees itself his
in its reply to the SO not as chairman but as moderator);
• was aware of the Spanish sub arrangement and was asked to calculate the deviation
between agreed quotas and effective sales in Spain
• organised the auditing of the data submitted by the parties
123
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Fides/AC Treuhand is the predominant firm in the European Commission
decisions that we can identify that is in the business of assisting cartels, but it is not the
only one. 126 Fides/AC Treuhand is an association management company (AMC). Many
AMC’s are primarily involved in the innocuous activity of helping professional and
industry/product groups set up and run conferences and other meetings. These AMC’s
have the expertise and leverage to secure venues and the associated services for
conferences and meetings that smaller professional organizations (say, a highly
specialized group of surgeons) do not have the infrastructure to put together in a costeffective manner. However, there are several AMC’s that list services or market
themselves on their websites in ways that go beyond organizing conferences and into the
realm of potentially assisting cartels. 127 Examples of some of these include 128:
benchmarking services within a trade association and across members of an
industry,
facilitating collaboration among members of industry,
promotion of information sharing, and
finding joint solutions to problems within an industry.
Some of the Fides/AC Treuhand cartels overlap in terms of the cartel duration as
determined by the European Commission. 129 Apparently, Fides/AC Treuhand is either
not asked by the European Commission about any other cartels in which they are
involved or they refuse to answer such queries by authorities. Large multi-product firms
will often cite their vast size as being the reason they cannot know of every potential
product division involved with collusion. Such a rationale is almost surely absent for a
cartel consulting firm such as Fides/AC Treuhand – their cartel advising business is likely
self-contained and senior management of that activity is likely aware of all cartels in
which Fides/AC Treuhand is involved. The lack of revelation by Fides/AC Treuhand of
their involvement with other cartels suggests the possibility that the extent of their
historical involvement in assisting cartels may be much greater than what is observed in
the EC Decisions.
•

calculated the new quotas after the acquisition and integration of competitors in the
agreement.
126 The EC decision in Marine Hoses as well as Yen Interest Rate Derivative make explicit note of a
cartel facilitator. For Marine Hose the cartel consultant was Peter Whittle of PW Consulting. See
Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/pleaagreement-peter-whittle (2017). For Yen Interest Rate Derivatives the cartel consultant was the
brokerage firm ICAP.
127 See John M. Kuhlman, The Nature and the Significance of Price Fixing Rings, 2 ANTITRUST L. & ECON.
REV. 69 (1969) (examining 50 price fixing complaints and indictments in the 1960s and finding that
23 trade associations were named page 76); George A. Hay and Daniel Kelley, An Empirical Survey of
Price Fixing Conspiracies, 17 J. L. & ECON. 13, 28 (1974) (“The current study demonstrated that trade
associations are often used as a coordinating device, especially when more than a given number of
firms are involved.”)
128 See http://www.2mpact.be/sites/default/files/AMSE_whitepaper2013_v2_0.pdf for a description
of AMCs as well as a list of AMCs throughout Europe.
129 See Figure 1B.
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V.

Suggested Policy Reforms

With respect to policy reforms, it is worth keeping in mind that experienced cartel
firms solve remarkably difficult problems in initiating and implementing a self-enforcing
agreement to suppress rivalry. They use cartel structures that are tailored to the
product/industry/market in question, and as conditions change they mutate the cartel
structures to adapt. Any policy reform must account for the clever, malleable adaptability
of experienced cartel firms.
This being said, there are some common features of cartel structures that can form
the basis for meaningful policy reforms. A policy reform that will be difficult for cartel
firms to use to their advantage should substantially encumber i) the ability of cartel firms
to monitor one another, ii) the ability of cartel firms to rectify unintentional deviations,
and iii) communication between cartel firms. A policy reform that will additionally be
difficult for serial colluders to use to their advantage should empower cartel members
that make a limited range of products, have smaller market shares, and have not been
detected in previous cartels to be rewarded for revealing cartel conduct.
Competition law and policy could take several steps to address the phenomenon
of serial collusion and create stronger incentives for firms to comply with the prohibition
against agreements to set prices, output levels, or distort other dimensions of rivalry. We
suggest that firms and enforcement agencies, as a condition of resolving cases, examine
the causes of collusion. We also propose that convicted colluders be subject to
heightened scrutiny and reporting obligations designed to deter future collusion. Finally,
enforcement agencies should give heavier weight to collusion as a factor in evaluating
mergers and treat repeated prior collusive behavior as an indicator that a merger may
facilitate future collusive conduct.
A common thread that runs through these proposals is that competition authorities
should collect and make better application of what might be called “antitrust big data.” A
great deal of contemporary discussion about the information services sector focuses on
how firms use data analytics to improve their capacity to understand markets and target
potential consumers. Over the course of decades (or, in the case of the United States,
over the course of a century), the operation of the competition system has generated an
immense body of information about how firms form cartels and operate them. Before
1993, enforcement and litigation provided a crucial source of empirical knowledge about
collusion. Scholarly studies such as Myron Watkins’s and Simon Whitney’s detailed
industry case studies and popular accounts of cartels (for example, John Fuller’s study in
the early 1960s of the electrical equipment cartel in the United States) drew chiefly upon
the records of litigated cases and reports of government agencies, such as the Federal
Trade Commission’s study from the late 1940s and early 1950s of the international
petroleum cartel. The enforcement programs that developed after the early 1990s greatly
expand the volume of publicly available information about how cartels take shape and
operate.
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The impact of this modern outpouring of information about cartels is evident in
the new scholarship and popular literature about cartels. The revelations of the lysine
cartel provided the foundation for a great book (Kurt Eichenwald’s The Informant in
2000), as well as a less successful movie of the same name, where Matt Damon’s
depiction of Mark Whitacre awkwardly straddles the boundary between drama and
comedy. The landmark contributions of the modern scholarly literature about the
operation of cartels, bid-rigging conspiracies, and the injury caused by illegal collusion
frequently build on recent case records or enforcement agency decisions.
Thus, in the current environment, government agencies can make use of four
significant information streams: (1) judicial decisions, and the publicly available record
of litigated cases, involving prosecutions by government agencies or private parties; (2)
nonpublic files that public agencies compile in the course of law enforcement
investigations; (3) government reports on individual industries; and (4) academic research
(such as individual company histories). The research presented in this paper draws on all
of these sources, mainly the first, third, and fourth. We have identified patterns of firm
behavior from our study of reported decisions involving cartel prosecutions, augmented
by our own review of publicly available information about the relevant firms and
government enforcement policy. We also use our experience in private litigation and in
government agencies to interpret this information.
From this work, we are convinced that fuller study of these and related
information sources would enable the competition community as a whole, and
government agencies in particular, to improve their understanding of how cartels function
and how public policy might be adjusted to deter them more effectively. Presented below
are our proposals for measures that would expand the policy of available data and apply
what we already know more effectively in law enforcement and other areas of
policymaking.

A. Cartel Reconstructions
A cartel infringement reflects a serious failure of corporate governance,
management, or operations. So long as human beings run companies, we cannot expect
that firms will comply perfectly with all legal commands all the time. A realistic view of
compliance is that firms can strive to minimize the severity of individual lapses and take
measures to avoid the repetition of past infringements.
Firms periodically experience catastrophes – for example, transportation disasters
that result in a large loss of life, or operational calamities (e.g., Deepwater Horizon) that
cause death and massive injury to property. In most instances, companies and
government agencies (such as the National Transportation Safety Board) respond to these
events by carrying out intensive ex post investigations that reconstruct the circumstances
that led to the failure and identify improvements for the future. Commercial airlines, for
example, devote great effort to incorporate lessons from operational failures into the
training of flight crews.
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Cartel episodes should elicit the same effort by enforcement agencies and cartel
participants to reconstruct the forces that led to the illicit collusion.130 As a condition for
participation in a leniency program or for entering a plea agreement, or as an element of
sentencing in a contested case, we would require the culpable firms to engage in an
externally audited reconstruction of the cartel and convey the results of the review to the
Department of Justice. The inquiry would be supervised by a monitor appointed from
within DOJ or by an expert outsider approved by the Department. The ex post review
would identify who conceived the collusive scheme, who approved its implementation,
who cooperated in its execution, what incentives inspired the cartel’s formation, and
which features of corporate management, governance, or culture facilitated participation
in the cartel. Additionally, the review should reveal all individuals who provided advice
and input regarding the initiation and implementation of the cartel. Importantly, the
review must, when applicable, identify links between collusive activities related to the
product under investigation, and activities that did in the past, or might in the future,
facilitate collusion in other products that the defendant manufactures or otherwise
controls. 131
We see the cartel reconstructions as serving three ends. The first is to provide
greater insights for public enforcement agencies about how cartels take shape and how
they operate. A better understanding about the formation and functioning of cartels
would put the public agencies in a better position: to detect cartels by identifying
behavior consistent with the coordination among rivals, and to devise superior remedies.
We advocate that agencies augment stovepipe price-fixing investigations, expanding
investigations across multiple product markets simultaneously.
The second result would be the opportunity for firms to develop more effective
compliance strategies. A necessary starting point for responding to a serious failure is to
understand its causes. As noted above, these include incentives that may have induced
the firm’s employees to engage in improper conduct, and weaknesses in internal
monitoring and supervision that enabled wrongful agreements to form and prosper. An
“After securing criminal convictions, the Division should also inquire, and publicly report details
on, how cartels were able to collude and sustain their collusion.” American Antitrust Institute, p. 26
https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/files/Cartels%20Chapter%20from%20%20AAI%20Transition%
20Report_100520082109.pdf
131 We have identified eight firms in the chemical or electrical cartel that applied for leniency for one
(or more) cartel while still participating in other cartels: Akzo Nobel applied for leniency in the
sodium gluconate cartel while still active in seven other cartels; Arkema/Atofina applied for leniency
in the monochloroacetic acid and organic peroxides cartels while still active in three other cartels;
Bayer applied for leniency in the citric acid cartel while still active in three other cartels; Bayer
applied for leniency in the rubber chemicals cartel while still active in two other cartels; Degussa
applied for leniency in the methionine cartel while still active in three other cartels; Degussa applied
for leniency in the organic peroxides cartel while still active in one other cartel; Rhone
Poulenc/Aventis applied for leniency in the methionine and vitamins cartels while still active in
another cartel; Solvay applied for leniency in the vitamins cartel while still active in one other cartel;
Hitachi applied for leniency in the power cables cartel while still active in two other cartels; Hitachi
applied for leniency in the alternators and starters cartel while still active in one other cartel; and
Samsung applied for leniency in the monitor tubes and smart card chips cartels while still active in
another cartel.
130
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enforcement agency might decide, in determining punishment, to give more credit to a
compliance program that emerged from a determined firm effort to undertake a careful
self-assessment and retool its operations to cure existing deficiencies. 132 Needless to say,
certain firms may need stronger motivation to craft effective compliance programs and
renounce price-fixing as a business model. For these firms, stronger deterrence via stiffer
penalties, better detection, and an intensified threat of successful prosecution may be a
desirable complement to the higher quality information disclosure that would come from
cartel reconstruction.
The third result is to enrich scholarship about cartels by giving scholars better
insight into how cartels are created and managed. The modern renaissance of cartelrelated scholarship has built significantly upon reported records of cartel cases, especially
decisions of the European Commission. Fuller disclosure of information about the
architecture and machinery of cartels would propel further advances in this literature,
which in turn would illuminate paths for enhancements of public policy and legal
doctrine. 133

B. Settlement and Monitoring
Serial cartel participants should be subject to progressively more stringent
monitoring by law enforcement institutions. Agreements reached in settlements or plea
agreements or conditions imposed in sentencing should expand the ability of government
agencies to monitor the behavior of cartelists. For a serial cartelist, either a DOJ official
or a monitor approved by DOJ and/or the court could insist on regular reporting involving
communications and transactions with competitors; adjustments in the incentives of sales
personnel; and changes in capacity related to previously cartelized products. 134
If a multi-product firm has been found to have participated in multiple cartels,
then it should be subject to additional requirements beyond standard penalties and
132 Compare Anne Riley & D. Daniel Sokol, Rethinking Compliance, 3 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 31
(2015) (discussing and supporting conditions in which a firm’s maintenance of a robust compliance
program should dictate a mitigation of punishment).
133 “EU, U.K., Korean, and Canadian enforcers release far more details about the conduct and harm
caused by cartels than does the Division. The information released by the Division rarely, if ever,
includes data about unindicted coconspirators, affected sales, conduct, and injuries caused by cartels.
The Division should reveal more of what it knows about these matters, either in plea agreements,
informations, sentencing agreements, or in follow-up studies using anonymous data. It should
publish all sentencing agreements, whether submitted to courts or not, on its Web page. This could
be done in a manner that would not interfere with the Division’s law enforcement efforts.” American
Antitrust Institute, 26 (2008)
https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/files/Cartels%20Chapter%20from%20%20AAI%20Transition%
20Report_100520082109.pdf
134 “The Division could require in sentencing agreements that defendants turn over simple postconviction reports for five years on their production costs, sales, and prices in the affected market.
For a representative sample of successful cartel prosecutions, the Division should report on the state
of competition in the affected industries.” American Antitrust Institute, 25 (2008)
https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/files/Cartels%20Chapter%20from%20%20AAI%20Transition%
20Report_100520082109.pdf
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requirements for antitrust compliance training as part of any plea agreement. It should be
required to report to the General Counsel’s office:
•

Any and all communications to or from competitors, directly or indirectly, both
within a product area and across product areas.

•

Any and all transactions with competitors, directly or indirectly, both within a
product area and across product areas. We define transactions broadly to include
settlement of contract or other business disputes, intellectual property license, or
in-kind transfer.

It should also be required to submit the above information for review by outside counsel
to determine if there are any indications of anti-competitive conduct. If there are any
indications of anti-competitive conduct then a report must be made to the relevant
antitrust enforcement agency. Such a report would immediately trigger the following
actions with regard to all products, directly or indirectly, potentially impacted by the
anticompetitive actions.
•

The firms under investigation will provide the relevant information and sufficient
data that would allow for a rigorous econometric evaluation of product
prices so that a but-for price can be calculated for the period of the potentially
inappropriate actions. This but-for price will then be used to assess whether the
actual prices during the period in question were elevated above non-collusive
levels.

•

The firms under investigation will provide all information regarding the
involvement of third parties in assisting with potential anti-competitive conduct
for all products under consideration.

•

The firms under investigation will provide all information regarding changes to
the incentives of their sales force that involve shifts away from the pursuit of
market share and toward the maintenance of elevated prices.

•

The firms under investigation will provide all information regarding capacity
changes for all products potentially impacted by the possible anticompetitive
conduct. Changes in capacity include exit from and entry to all products
potentially impacted by the possible anticompetitive conduct.

• The firms under investigation will provide all information regarding any conduct
that would be considered a dominant firm conduct for all products potentially
impacted by the possible anticompetitive conduct.

C. Merger Review
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Effective merger policy interacts with anti-cartel policy in two ways. First, absent
compelling efficiencies, it should block horizontal mergers by firms attempting to regain
the pricing discipline they had previously enjoyed until their cartel was uncovered and
prosecuted. There has been a discouraging pattern of mergers in Europe following recent
success prosecuting cartels. 135 These mergers may have compromised much of the
competitive gain that consumers expected to see from vigorous anti-cartel enforcement
by the European Commission. Second, and perhaps more importantly, effective merger
policy should block mergers that stabilize or encourage cartels. This second concern is
subsumed within a broader concern known as coordinated effects. 136 A coordinated
effects problem arises if a merger “change[s] the competitive environment so that the
remaining firms could or could more easily coordinate on price, output, capacity, or other
dimension of competition.” 137
Enforcement agencies should make use of cartel reconstructions and the results of
expanded monitoring when reviewing mergers involving a serial cartelist. This is most
important in building coordinated effects cases, where the propensity of firms to explore
coordination with rivals, post-merger, should be a major factor in predicting whether a
merger will have an adverse competitive effect. In the ordinary merger review, we
propose that government agencies treat past collusive behavior as a serious indication of
likely future anticompetitive effects.
The U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines already recognize that collusion may be
relevant to a coordinated effects analysis. 138 But “[m]erger policies in the EU, the US,
See Marx & Zhou, supra note 109, at 1 (Introduction of leniency in the EU in 1996 increased the pace
of horizontal mergers involving cartelists. But the cartel settlement procedure slowed the pace.)
“Competition authorities have repeatedly permitted mergers among former cartel members, often without
review, let alone structural intervention. Davies et al. (2014) examine mergers among former cartel
conspirators and conclude that only 29% of the mergers were investigated by the EC.” Marvão, supra note
31.
136 Both the United States and the EU examine coordinated effects when deciding whether to approve
horizontal merges. The FTC advises that a horizontal merger may “lessen competition … by creating
or enhancing the ability of the remaining firms to act in a coordinated way on some competitive
dimension.” https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrustlaws/mergers/competitive-effects. And the EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines - §22 state: “…
horizontal mergers may significantly impede effective competition... by changing the nature of
competition in such a way that firms that previously were not coordinating their behaviour, are now
significantly more likely to coordinate and raise prices or otherwise harm effective competition. A
merger may also make coordination easier, more stable or more effective for firms which were
coordinating prior to the merger (coordinated effects).”
137 FTC Competition Guidance, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guideantitrust-laws/mergers/competitive-effects.
138 The Horizontal Merger Guidelines of 2010 recognize the significance of past collusion for a proper
coordinated effects analysis. “The Agencies presume that market conditions are conducive to
coordinated interaction if firms representing a substantial share in the relevant market appear to
have previously engaged in express collusion affecting the relevant market, unless competitive
conditions in the market have since changed significantly. Previous express collusion in another
geographic market will have the same weight if the salient characteristics of that other market at the
time of the collusion are comparable to those in the relevant market. Failed previous attempts at
collusion in the relevant market suggest that successful collusion was difficult pre-merger but not so
135
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and many other jurisdictions may not adequately take into account the collusive history
of merging firms.” 139 Building analysis of collusive activity into coordinated effects
review may be impeded if enforcers lack the sort of information that could be gathered in
a cartel reconstruction or by monitoring the behavior of serial colluders. And such
analysis is surely impeded by “stove-piping” which occurs for example when price fixing
and mergers are handled by separate units in the Antitrust Division of the DOJ and those
units do not communicate adequately. 140 “Remedies such as disclosure, divestiture of
assets, selling minority shares in competitors, or licensure of intellectual property to
competitors may change the nature of competition in the market and make collusion more
difficult (see Marx & Zhou, 2015 regarding post-cartel mergers). This is particularly
relevant if recidivism is industry-driven.” 141

D. Beyond Leniency
In Section IV.B we explained that leniency programs can be manipulated by serial
colluders to intimidate small firms. Perhaps beefed up monitoring of serial colluders will
minimize abuse of leniency, and antitrust authorities can implement a leniency program
that destabilizes cartels without unintended consequences.
Regardless of how well manipulation of leniency programs can be controlled, we
favor a complementary reform patterned after familiar bounty programs. We envision a
bounty program that rewards certain small firms when they disclose they are participating
with a serial colluder in a cartel. Specifically, the disclosing firm must have a relatively
small market share, must make a limited range of products, must not be a cartel
instigator, and must not have participated in any other cartels. 142 The disclosing firm

difficult as to deter attempts, and a merger may tend to make success more likely. Previous collusion
or attempted collusion in another product market may also be given substantial weight if the salient
characteristics of that other market at the time of the collusion are closely comparable to those in the
relevant market.” Horizontal Merger Guidelines, U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade
Commission, p. 25 August 19, 2010 https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/mergerreview/100819hmg.pdf
139 Marx & Zhou, supra note 109, at 24.
140 “Price fixing and mergers are handled by separate units in the Division, yet the two may be
related. A single horizontal merger in the United States or abroad can make formation of a cartel
feasible. It is frequently the case that cartel convictions are followed by spin-offs and other industry
restructuring. A history of collusion in an industry may signal that a rise in coordinated effects is
likely after a proposed merger is consummated. The Division should study whether there is a pattern
of cartel members’ acquiring rivals, large customers, or suppliers in the affected industry anywhere
in the world before, during, or immediately after, the violation. Any negative findings should be
incorporated into the Division’s enforcement decisions.” American Antitrust Institute 25-26 (2008)
https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/files/Cartels%20Chapter%20from%20%20AAI%20Transition%
20Report_100520082109.pdf
141 Marvão, supra note 31.
142 Note that we intend to limit these programs to disclosures that expose at least one serial colluder
as a cartel member. Thus, the effectiveness of the program depends on transparent enforcement of
anti-cartel laws that clearly identify serial colluders. We leave open the question of exactly how the
program would define serial colluders, and leave open the question of whether this sort of bounty
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should be treated as a qui tam relator, exempt from all criminal penalties and paid a
percentage of the fines recovered by enforcement authorities from the other cartel
members.
Of course, creating qui tam incentives for small cartel members will create a
disincentive for large multi-product firms to include these smaller firms in cartels, which
is socially beneficial. In the vitamins cartel it can be argued that Roche and BASF were
colluding from 1985 to 1989 but then expanded the collusion to many other producers in
the industry resulting in substantial price increases in vitamins from late 1989 to the end
of the cartel. We conjecture that if Roche and BASF faced substantial disincentives to
include smaller firms in the cartel then the social harm from the collusion would have
been greatly reduced.
Given the disincentive to have smaller firms join the cartel, a natural response by
serial colluders will be to attempt to force smaller firms from the market at the inception
of the collusive conduct. But, as noted in Kovacic et. al., 143 predatory conduct against a
small firm when no firm in the industry is a dominant firm is a super plus factor – it
almost surely cannot occur without explicit collusion by the large firms in the industry. In
fact, as a more general point, antitrust enforcement authorities should conduct an
extensive review when a small firm in an industry is claiming predatory conduct by larger
firms that are known serial colluders.

E. Cartel Facilitators
In Section IV.C we documented the many ways that Fides/AC Treuhand aided
cartels by gathering information, analyzing cartel problems, and guiding cartels members
to adopting practices that increased cartel stability and profitability. Yet, European cartel
enforcers initially made little effort to punish or deter repeated cartel involvement by this
cartel facilitator. Enforcers have noted in passing the presence of cartel facilitators in at
least two other settings, 144 but they do not seem to be a high priority.
We believe anti-cartel policy has underestimated the significance of intermediaries
such as Fides/AC Treuhand in the execution of successful collusive schemes. These
advisors apply valuable know how accumulated in the course of managing a number of
cartels over time. Consequently, we would elevate these enterprises as focal points of an
anti-cartel program. As a starting point, we would urge the application of penalties that
recognize their significant contributions to illegal collusion, including injunctions that bar
the consultancy from providing cartel management advice in the future. We also would
insist that third party advisors reveal the full breadth of their cartel management
experience as a condition of obtaining leniency in an individual case. Furthermore, we
program should be available more broadly. Counseling against broad availability of such a program is
the risk of chilling desirable competitive behavior.
143 See Kovacic et al., supra note 63, at 425-26.
144 Footnote 126 notes that cartel facilitators were present in the Marine Hoses as well as Yen
Interest Rate Derivative cases.
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would demand that such advisors assist enforcement agencies in the reconstruction of
past cartel episodes. We anticipate that cartel reconstructions and monitoring of serial
colluders will improve the detection of cartel facilitators in the future.

VI.

Conclusions

We documented in this paper that many large multi-product firms have engaged
in explicit collusion for extended periods of time across a variety of products with
inclusive participation. Few of these cartels have short duration. The time periods of
many of the cartels overlap but they are not coincident. We argued that this evidence
points away from a rogue division manager explanation of price fixing. It fits better with
our conjecture that many firms have embraced explicit collusion as a business model. The
frequent use of an external cartel facilitator in the chemical industry provides further
evidence for this conjecture.
We explained that large multi-product firms enjoy multiple advantages when
embracing explicit collusion as part of their business model. First, as noted in Section IV,
they can address cartel issues across their portfolio of cartels rather than within each
cartel in isolation. Second, they can use their experience in previous collusive conduct to
enhance the profits of current and future cartels in which they are involved. Third, serial
colluders can take advantage of some antitrust enforcement tools, such as leniency
programs.
Our policy recommendations begin with two premises. First, given the obvious
evidence of serial collusion, antitrust enforcement should expand beyond stovepipe
investigations of collusive conduct. 145 Second, given that serial colluders are enormously
clever and flexible, policy reforms should attack the underpinnings of cartel structures.
To get a rough sense of the inattention shown by antitrust enforcers and antitrust law scholars to
problems created by multi-market contact we compared citation patterns to two prominent articles
from the industrial organization literature: the 1990 Multi-market Contact and Collusive Behavior
paper by Bernheim and Whinston to Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73
AMER. ECON. REV. 267 (1983).Even though the Bernheim and Whinston article was published seven
years after the Salop and Scheffman article they have a roughly comparable number of citations in
Google Scholar – 1536 for Salop and Scheffman compared to 1496 for Bernheim and Whinston. We
interpret this to mean both articles are highly influential among economics and management
scholars. Next we compared the citations to the two articles in the Hein Law Journal Library. Salop
and Scheffman got 165 citations compared to only 25 citations for Bernheim and Whinston. Next we
looked at HERBERT J. HOVENKAMP & PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATIONS (2012) and found nine cites to Salop and Scheffman but no cites to
Bernheim and Whinston – though we did find one cite to Bernheim and Whinston in LOUIS KAPLOW,,
COMPETITION POLICY AND PRICE FIXING (2013). Finally, we examined documents posted on the websites
of the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the DOJ and we found 35 citations to Salop and Scheffman
and only 5 citations to Bernheim and Whinston. We take this citation pattern as evidence that
antitrust enforcers and antitrust law scholars cite and discuss significant economic theory, as
represented by Raising Rivals’ Costs, when they think the theory may have antitrust applications.
Apparently they think of price fixing as a one-shot phenomenon and thus rarely cite Bernheim and
Whinston. We think that if they better understood the multi-market contact associated with serial
145
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In this light, we recommend that large multi-product firms classified as serial
colluders by enforcement authorities be required, as part of any antitrust plea or
settlement, to provide a full reconstruction of the history of the cartel as well as detailed
information going forward of any and all (i) communications and information exchanges
with competitors, (ii) transactions and/or transfers, including settlements from litigation,
with competitors, (iii) sufficient data required by authorities to construct a reliable
econometric model to construct a but-for price to compare to actual prices, (iv)
communications with third parties that provided advice regarding anti-competitive
conduct, (v) changes to the incentives of their sales force, (vi) capacity changes,
including entry and exit, in any and all products, and (vii) exit and entry by rival firms.
We also recommend that any serial colluder applying for a merger be subject to a
mandatory coordinated effects review, even for products that are only produced by one of
the merging parties.
Finally, we recommend that small firms with no record of serial collusion be
given not just leniency for reporting a cartel to antitrust authorities but be actually
rewarded with a share of the fines collected by enforcement authorities. We also
recommend that cartel enforcers give higher priority to the goal of detecting, punishing,
and deterring firms likeFides/AC Treuhand that facilitate price-fixing agreements.

Appendix
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

EC Decisions and Cartel Firms listed in Figures 1A and 1B
Bitumen: Case COMP / 38.456 – Bitumen - NL, September 13, 2006
a. Shell
Butadiene Rubber, Case COMP/F/38.638 – Butadiene Rubber and Emulsion
Styrene Butadiene Rubber, November 29, 2006
a. Bayer, Shell
Calcium Carbide, COMP/39.396 – Calcium carbide and magnesium based reagents
for the steel and gas industries, July 22, 2009
a. Akzo Nobel, Degussa
Candle Waxes, Case COMP/39181 – Candle Waxes, October 1, 2008
a. Shell
*Cartonboard, IV/C/33.833 - Cartonboard, July 13, 1994
a. Fides/AC Treuhand
Chloroprene Rubber, COMP/38629 - Chloroprene Rubber, December 5, 2007
a. Bayer
Choline Chloride: Case COMP/E-2/37.533 – Choline Chloride, Comm’n Decision,
December 9, 2004

collusion they would show more interest in applications of the multi-market contact theory to anticartel enforcement.
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a. Akzo Nobel , BASF
8. Citric Acid: Case COMP/E-1/36.604 – Citric Acid, Comm’n Decision, 2002
O.J.(L239) 18. December 5, 2001
a. Bayer
9. *Fatty Acids: IV/31.128 — Fatty Acids, Comm'n Decision, December 2, 1986
a. Fides/AC Treuhand
10. Food Flavor Enhancers: Case COMP/C.37.671 – Flood Flavour Enhancers,
Comm’n Decision 2004 (L 75) December 17, 2002
a. <None from those listed in Figure 5>
11. Heat Stabilizers, COMP/38589 – Heat Stablisers, November 11, 2009
a. Akzo Nobel, Arkema/ Atofina, Elf Aquitaine, Fides/AC Treuhand
12. *Hydrogen Peroxide, IV/30.907 — Peroxygen products, November 23, 1984
a. Atochem, Solvay, Degussa
13. Hydrogen Peroxide, Case COMP/F/38.620 – Hydrogen Peroxide and Perborate,
May 3, 2006
a. Akzo Nobel, Arkema/Atofina, Degussa, Elf Aquitaine, Solvay
14. Lysine, Case COMP/36.545/F3 . Amino Acids, June 7, 2000
a. <None from those listed in Figure 5>
15. Methacrylates, Case No COMP/F/38.645 — Methacrylates, May 31, 2006
a. Arkema/Atofina, Degussa, ICI, Elf Aquitaine
16. Methionine: Case C.37.519 – Methionine, Comm’n Decision, 2002 (L 255) 1. July 2,
2002
a. Degussa, Rhone Poulenc/Aventis
17. Methyglucamine: Case COMP/E-2/37.978 – Methylglucamine, Comm’n Decision,
November 27, 2002
a. Rhone Poulenc/Aventis
18. Monochloroacetic Acid: Case COMP/E-1/.37.773– MCAA, Comm’n Decision,
January 19, 2005
a. Akzo Nobel, Arkema/Atofina, Elf Aquitaine, Fides/AC Treuhand, Hoechst
19. Organic Peroxides: Case COMP/E-2/37.857 – Organic Peroxyde, Comm’n
Decision, December 10, 2003
a. Akzo Nobel, Arkema/Atofina, Degussa, Fides/AC Treuhand,
20. *Polyethylene, IV/31.866, LdPE, December 21, 1988
a. Atochem, BASF, Bayer, Dow, Enichem, Fides/AC Treuhand, Hoechst, ICI,
Repsol, Shell
21. *Polypropylene, IV/31.149 – Polypropylene, April 23, 1986
a. Atochem, BASF, Fides/AC Treuhand, Hoechst, ICI, Rhone
Poulenc/Aventis, Shell, Solvay
22. *Potash, IV/795 – Kaliand Salz/Kali Chemie, December 21, 1973
a. BASF, Solvay
23. *PVC, IV/31.865, PVC, December 21, 1988
a. Atochem, BASF, Enichem, Fides/AC Treuhand, Hoechst, ICI, Shell, Solvay
24. Rubber Chemicals: Case COMP/F/38.443 – Rubber Chemicals, Comm’n Decision
December 21, 2005 (summary at 2006 (L 353) 50)
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25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

a. Akzo Nobel (through Flexsys) 146, Bayer
*Soda Ash, COMP/33.133-B: Soda-ash, December 19, 1990
a. BASF, Solvay
Sodium Chlorate, Case COMP/38.695 – Sodium Chlorate, June 11, 2008
a. Akzo Nobel, Arkema/Atofina, Elf Aquitaine
Sodium Gluconate, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-011355_en.htm?locale=en#file.tmp_Foot_1, March 19, 2002
a. Akzo Nobel
Sorbates: Case COMP/E-1/37.370 – Sorbates, Comm’n Decision October 1, 2003
a. Hoechst
*Synthetic Fibers, IV/30.810 - Synthetic fibres, July 4, 1984
a. Bayer, Hoechst, ICI, Rhone Poulenc/Aventis
Vitamins: Case COMP/E-1/37.512– Vitamins, Comm’n Decision, 2001 O.J. (L6)
November 21, 2001
a. BASF, Rhone Poulenc/Aventis, Solvay
*Woodpulp, IV/29.725 - Wood pulp, December 19, 1984
a. Fides/AC Treuhand
Nitrile Butadiene Rubber, COMP/38.628 - Nitrile Butadiene Rubber, January 23,
2008
a. Bayer

EC Decisions and Cartel Firms listed in Figure 6
1. DRAMs, COMP/38511 – DRAMs, May 19, 2010
a. Hitachi, Mitsubishi, Samsung, Toshiba
2. LCD, COMP/39.309 – LCD - Liquid Crystal Displays, December 8, 2010
a. Samsung
3. TV and computer monitor tubes, AT.39437 – TV and computer monitor tubes,
December 5, 2012
a. Panasonic, Samsung, Toshiba
4. Smart Card Chips, AT.39574 – Smart Card Chips, September 3, 2014
a. Hitachi, Mitsubishi, Samsung
5. Optical Disk Drives, Case AT.39639 — Optical Disk Drives, October 21, 2015
a. Hitachi, Samsung, Sony
6. Power Transformers, COMP/39.129 - Power Transformers, October 7, 2009
a. Hitachi, Toshiba
7. Gas Insulated Switchgear, COMP/F/38.899 – Gas Insulated Switchgear, January 24,
2007
a. Hitachi, Mitsubishi, Toshiba
8. Power Cables, AT.39610 — Power Cables, April 2, 2014
a. Hitachi, Mitsubishi
9. Alternators and Starters, AT.40028 - Alternators and Starters, January 27, 2016
a. Hitachi, Mitsubishi
EC Decision at para 13, “The holding company for Flexsys is Flexsys Holding B.V. of which Akzo
Nobel Chemicals International B.V. holds 50%, the remaining 50% being held by Solutia Inc and
Solutia Europe N.V. together.”
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10. Professional Videotape, COMP/38.432 – Professional Videotape, November 20,
2007
a. <None from those listed in Figure 6>
11. Elevators and Escalators, COMP/E-1/38.823 - PO/Elevators and Escalators,
February 21, 2007
a. Mitsubishi
12. CRT Glass, COMP/39605 CRT Glass, October 19, 2011
a. Samsung
13. Rechargeable Batteries, AT.39904 – Rechargeable batteries, December 12, 2016
a. Panasonic, Samsung, Sony
14. Refrigeration Compressors, COMP/39600 – Refrigeration Compressors, December
7, 2011
a. Panasonic
15. Capacitors, AT.40136 – Capacitors, March 21, 2018
a. Panasonic, Hitachi
DoJ Decisions and Cartel Firms listed in Figure 7
1. Airbags: Case 5:12-cr-20383-JCO-LJM, June 6, 2012
a. Autoliv
2. Airbags: Case 3:14-cr-00349-JZ, September 29, 2014
a. Toyoda
3. Airbags: Case 2:12-cr-20491-BAF-LJM, July 30, 2012
a. TRW
4. Air Conditioning Systems: Case 2:13-cr-20713-GCS-PJK, September 26, 2013
a. Valeo
5. Air Flow Meters: Case 2:13-cr-20707-MOB-LJM, September 26, 2013
a. Hitachi
6. Alternators/Starters: Case 2:13-cr-20707-MOB-LJM, September 26, 2013
a. Hitachi
7. Alternators/Starters: Case 2:13-cr-20712-PJD-DRG, September 26, 2013
a. Mitsuba
8. Alternators/Starters: Case 2:13-cr-20710-RHC-MAR, September 26, 2013
a. Mitsubishi
9. Alternators/Starters: Case 5:15-cr-20197-JCO-APP, March 31, 2015
a. Robert Bosch
10. Anti-Vibration Rubber Products: Case 3:14-cr-0068-JZ, February 13, 2014
a. <None from those listed in Figure 7>
11. Anti-Vibration Rubber Products: Case 3:13-cr-0059-JZ, February 6, 2014
a. <None from those listed in Figure 7>
12. Anti-Vibration Rubber Products: Case 3:13-cr-00439-JJH, September 26, 2013
a. <None from those listed in Figure 7>
13. Automotive Brake Hoses: Case 3:14-cr-00394-JJH, October 31, 2014
a. Hitachi
14. Automotive Brake Hoses: Case 3:14-cr-00349-JZ, September 29, 2014
a. Toyoda
15. Automotive Wire Harnesses: Case 2:12-cr-20064-DML-MKM, January 30, 2012
a. Yazaki
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16. Bearings: Case 1:13-cr-00104-HJW, September 26, 2013
a. <None from those listed in Figure 7>
17. Bearings: Case 1:13-cr-00103-HJW, September 26, 2013
a. <None from those listed in Figure 7>
18. Compressors/Condensers: Case 2:13-cr-20711-AJT-LJM, September 26, 2013
a. Mitsubishi
19. Electronic Control Units: Case 2:12-cr-20063-DML-DRG, January 30, 2012
a. Denso
20. Electronic Throttle Bodies: Case 2:13-cr-20707-MOB-LJM, September 26, 2013
a. Hitachi
21. Fan Motors: Case 2:13-cr-20712-PJD-DRG, September 26, 2013
a. Mitsuba
22. Fuel Injection Systems: Case 2:13-cr-20707-MOB-LJM, September 26, 2013
a. Hitachi
23. Fuel Ratio Sensors: Case 2:14-cr-20494-MOB-DRG, August 19, 2014
a. NGK Spark Plug
24. Fuel Senders: Case 2:12-cr-20064-DML-MKM, January 30, 2012
a. Yazaki
25. Heater Control Panels: Case 2:12-cr-20063-DML-DRG, January 30, 2012
a. Denso
26. Ignition Coils: Case 2:13-cr-20707-MOB-LJM, September 26, 2013
a. Hitachi
27. Ignition Coils: Case 2:13-cr-20710-RHC-MAR, September 26, 2013
a. Mitsubishi
28. Instrument Panel Clusters: Case 2:12-cr-20064-DML-MKM, January 30, 2012
a. Yazaki
29. Inverters: Case 2:13-cr-20707-MOB-LJM, September 26, 2013
a. Hitachi
30. Motor Generators: Case 2:13-cr-20707-MOB-LJM, September 26, 2013
a. Hitachi
31. Oxygen Sensors: Case 5:15-cr-20197-JCO-APP, March 31, 2015
a. Robert Bosch
32. Oxygen Sensors: Case 2:14-cr-20494-MOB-DRG, August 19, 2014
a. NGK Spark Plug
33. Power Window Motors: Case 2:13-cr-20712-PJD-DRG, September 26, 2013
a. Mitsuba
34. Seatbelts: Case 5:12-cr-20383-JCO-LJM, June 6, 2012
a. Autoliv
35. Seatbelts: Case 2:12-cr-20491-BAF-LJM, July 30, 2012
a. TRW
36. Spark Plugs: Case 5:15-cr-20197-JCO-APP, March 31, 2015
a. Robert Bosch
37. Spark Plugs: Case 2:14-cr-20494-MOB-DRG, August 19, 2014
a. NGK Spark Plug
38. Speed Sensor Wire Assemblies: Case 2:12-cr-20215-MOB-LJM, April 3, 2012
a. <None from those listed in Figure 7>
39. Steering Angle Sensors and Switches: Case 2:13-cr-20540-SJM-MAR, July 18, 2013
a. Panasonic, Toyoda
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40. Steering Wheels: Case 2:12-cr-20491-BAF-LJM, July 30, 2012
a. TRW
41. Steering Wheels: Case 5:12-cr-20383-JCO-LJM, June 6, 2012
a. Autoliv
42. Steering Wheels: Case 3:14-cr-00349-JZ, September 29, 2014
a. Toyoda
43. Variable Valve Timing Devices: Case 2:13-cr-20707-MOB-LJM, September 26, 2013
a. Hitachi
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

EC Decisions and Cartel Firms listed in Figure 7
Air Conditioning Systems: Case AT.39960 – Thermal Systems, August 3, 2017
a. Denso, Valeo
Alternators/Starters: AT.40028 – Alternators and Starters, January 27, 2016
a. Hitachi, Mitsubishi, Denso
Automotive Wire Harnesses: Case AT.39748 – Automotive Wire Harnesses,
October 7, 2013
a. Yazaki
Bearings: Case AT.39922-Bearings, March 19, 2014
a. <None from those listed in Figure 7>
Compressors/Condensers: Case AT.39960 – Thermal Systems, August 3, 2017
a. Denso†, Valeo, Panasonic (e-compressors)
Radiators/Fans: Case AT.39960 – Thermal Systems, August 3, 2017
a. Denso, Valeo
Spark Plugs: Case AT.40113- Spark Plugs, February 21, 2018
a. Bosch, Denso, NGK Spark Plug

EC Decisions and Cartel Firms listed in Figure 8
1. CEEMEA: Case 1:18-cr-00061-JSR – United States of America v. BNP Paribus
USA, Inc., January 25, 2018
a. <None from those listed in Figure 8>
2. Euro Interest Rate Derivatives
a. JPMorgan - http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-16-4307_en.htm,
December 7, 2016
b. RBS – Case AT.39914, December 4, 2013
3. EUR – USD Forex
a. JPMorgan – Case 3:15-cr-00079-SRU, May 20, 2015
b. RBS – Case 3:15-cr-00080-SRU, May 20, 2015
4. Swiss Franc
a. JPMorgan, RBS, UBS
i. Case AT.39924, October 21, 2014
ii. Case AT.39924 (CHF LIBOR), October 21, 2014
5. Yen
a. JPMorgan, RBS, UBS
i. Case AT.39861, February 4, 2015
6. Municipal Bonds
a. JPMorgan
i. Hertz, James L. – Case 1:10-cr-01178, November 30, 2010
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ii. Wright, Alexander – Case 1:12-cr-00551-SAS, July 18, 2012
b. UBS
i. Heinz, Gary – Case No. 15-432 – Gary Heinz, et. al. Petitioners v.
United States of America
ii. Ghavami, Peter - Case No. 15-432 – Gary Heinz, et. al. Petitioners v.
United States of America
iii. Welty, Michael - Case No. 15-432 – Gary Heinz, et. al. Petitioners v.
United States of America
iv. Zaino, Mark – Case 1:10-cr-00434-TPG, May 19, 2010
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